

EVALUATION OF DISASTER RISK REDUCTION MAINSTREAMING IN DG ECHO'S HUMANITARIAN ACTIONS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary

1. INTRODUCTION.....	11
2. OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY.....	11
3. INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY FINDINGS.....	14
3.1 DG ECHO and disaster risk reduction.....	14
3.2 Legal mandate.....	15
3.3 Policy and strategy.....	16
3.4 Budgetary frameworks.....	18
3.5 DG ECHO staff awareness and capacity.....	19
3.6 Existing tools and frameworks.....	21
4. OPERATIONAL FINDINGS.....	22
4.1 Mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction.....	22
4.1.1 <i>Evidence of DRR or good practice</i>	22
4.2 Factors affecting integration.....	23
4.2.1 <i>Operational environment</i>	23
4.2.2 <i>Scale, hazard and funding decision</i>	24
4.2.3 <i>Complex emergencies</i>	25
4.2.4 <i>Regional contexts</i>	25
4.2.5 <i>The role of DIPECHO</i>	26
4.3 Sector responses.....	27
4.3.1 <i>Shelter</i>	27
4.3.2 <i>Water, sanitation and hygiene promotion</i>	28
4.3.3 <i>Food security and livelihoods</i>	28
4.3.4 <i>Health</i>	29
4.3.5 <i>Social Protection</i>	29
4.4 Appropriateness, impact and cost effectiveness.....	30
4.5 Partners, coordination and the cluster system.....	33
4.6 Knowledge management and lessons learning.....	36
4.7 Complementarities and synergy.....	37
4.8 Advocacy.....	39
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	39
Glossary of terms.....	47
List of abbreviations and acronyms.....	48

Executive Summary

Introduction

1. In the last three to four years the issue of disaster risk reduction (DRR) has become increasingly important in both developmental and humanitarian policy and programming. Reducing the underlying vulnerability of people to disasters and increasing their resilience or coping capacities is now seen as an important element in poverty reduction and ultimately in sustainable development efforts. Following the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held in early 2006, many organisations have adopted DRR policies and there is a common international agenda in the form of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA).
2. As the world's largest humanitarian donor agency, DG ECHO is increasingly concerned about incorporating DRR into its response actions. Although DG ECHO has a long-standing programme of community-based disaster preparedness known as DIPECHO, to date the organisation has not had a clear policy for DRR. However, this position is changing and the organisation is now in the process of developing an internal policy. At the same time there is a Commission-wide consultation process, together with external partners and Member States, led by DG Development to finalise a Communication on DRR.
3. It is within this context that the Evaluation Sector of DG ECHO commissioned this evaluation to explore the issue of mainstreaming of DRR in the funding of humanitarian actions. The evaluation was managed by Aguaconsult, a UK-based consulting firm, and took place between February and May 2008.

Purpose and methodology

4. The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the mainstreaming of DRR into DG ECHO humanitarian actions, with a focus on different relief sectors and stages in the disaster cycle. Unlike a conventional evaluation exercise, it is not intended to assess the success of individual projects, nor the performance of specific DG ECHO implementing partners. Rather it is a thematic evaluation focussing on mainstreaming DRR, which by definition also includes an assessment of how far the concept is commonly understood and applied across DG ECHO itself. The evaluation also seeks to address the linkages between mainstreaming DRR interventions in DG ECHO funded projects with the actions of funding by other EC funding instruments and other development partners (*see pages 11 - 13*).
5. In addition, the evaluation includes the production of a draft inventory of good practice for better integrating DRR into the design of emergency relief operations. This is presented by sector as the primary level of analysis, and focuses on practical guidance, primarily aimed at DG ECHO staff. This inventory is contained in a separate report submitted to the DG ECHO Evaluation Sector.
6. The evaluation team held extensive meetings with policy, legal and geographic desk staff in DG ECHO headquarters. The team then visited ten countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Asia and Africa, including visits to DG ECHO Regional Support Offices. The methodologies for the evaluation included desk reviews of policy

and operational documents, project site visits meetings with partners and other DRR stakeholders (including UN agencies, NGOs, government disaster management bodies, local government and affected people in the project areas).

7. The evaluation process was constrained by a relatively limited time in the field, the wide range of contexts to examine, as well as an underlying lack of monitoring being carried out to measure the real impact of DRR interventions. As such the findings in this report are based on an assessment of countries and projects visited, and may not include all evidence relating to the mainstreaming of DRR within DG ECHO operations globally (*see page 13*).

Main findings and lessons learned

8. Despite these constraints the evaluation team was able to determine a number of important findings at the operational, policy and institutional levels. The growing trend of including DRR points to an *encouraging situation* in which the operational practice of integrating DRR into humanitarian response by DG ECHO and its partners appears to be *ahead of its policy development*. The reasons for this appear to vary from the influence of DIPECHO, trying to make response more effective (good humanitarian practice), to a pragmatic realisation that as vulnerability increases and ability to cope decreases, there is a need to break the cycle of risk to natural hazards and other emergencies. Findings at the *operational level* include:
 - Despite constraints posed by the current budgetary frameworks and legal mandate *considerable progress* on mainstreaming DRR activities has been made by a range of project partners (including INGOs, the Red Cross Movement and UN agencies). In many, if not the overwhelming majority of cases these interventions are not explicitly linked to, or labelled as, 'risk reduction' activities by practitioners, but are more often understood as 'good humanitarian practice' (*see pages 22 -23*).
 - The integration of DRR into humanitarian response is most evident in activities related to rehabilitation and recovery. Although there is some evidence of risk reduction in the immediate response phase (particularly relating to environmental health and control of epidemic diseases in displaced populations), many DG ECHO staff and partners find this the most challenging aspect of integrating DRR (*see page 23*).
 - Integration of DRR by DG ECHO-funded projects is primarily manifested at community level, through capacity building, training and response actions. There is also evidence of significant intervention at the level of local and regional government and in a minority of cases even at national level (*see page 23*).
 - The evidence for integration of risk reduction in humanitarian response actions varies considerably between *sectors*; shelter and water and sanitation show the greatest progress. There is a growing consensus that increased focus on early inclusion of *livelihood support* may be an effective way of mainstreaming DRR in response (*see pages 27 -29*).
 - The key determinant appears to be the attitude and familiarity with DRR concepts of both DG ECHO staff and partners. The type of funding decision, together with the scale of the disaster, appeared to be bigger determinants in levels of DRR integration than either speed of onset, or type of hazard. Evidence suggests that the

larger the scale of an event the less likely the integration of DRR into the humanitarian response; conversely, there appears to be more success in integrating DRR in response to smaller-scale, localised events that are cyclical (see pages 23 - 24).

- Most of the interventions studied by this evaluation were found to be *appropriate* to the on-going response and in general took into account the local cultural conditions and profile of the population, including accounting for the different needs of men and women and targeting the most vulnerable groups (see pages 30 - 31).
- Measurement of *impact* of DRR in terms of reduced vulnerability to risks both in the immediate response phase as well as to future hazards remains weak and is constrained by lack of adequate indicators and effective monitoring procedures (see pages 31 - 32).
- Considerable efforts have been made by DG ECHO staff at all levels to work in a more integrated and *complementary* manner with the developmental programmes of the EC and other donors. But because of the lack of adequate funding mechanisms and policy frameworks, concrete successes to ensure the transition of DRR into longer-term programming have been rare (see pages 36 - 38).

9. Despite these considerable positive findings, DG ECHO continues to face a number of **challenges and constraints with regard to policy and institutional capacity for integrating** DRR into humanitarian actions. The main lessons learned can be summarised as follows:

- The *lack of a policy on DRR*, with a clear expression of its role and function within the context of the broader EC structure and referencing to the HFA, is a major constraint for DG ECHO, especially when increasing numbers of other donors are entering the field of DRR (see pages 15 - 17).
- As well as this lack of policy framework, DG ECHO currently lacks the *institutional capacity and tools* to better ensure that DRR is integrated into its humanitarian actions: a common and unambiguous terminology, staff training, modified procedural tools and documents and DRR-specific resources are all required to ensure that DRR is internalised and applied consistently (see pages 19 - 22).
- The evaluators recognise that DG ECHO cannot address the issue of DRR in humanitarian response alone. Its projects are limited in time and scale and without appropriate mechanisms being put into place to improve linkages with the interventions of other institutions, particularly other EC Services, DG ECHO runs the risk of continuing to work well, but in isolation, and without the opportunities for *improved complementarity and coherence* to achieve impact at scale (see pages 37 - 38).
- Much effort has been put into exploring the *linkages for risk reduction between relief and development* with other EC Services especially at country level, where DG ECHO staff hold much valuable experience. But there is a gap in financing mechanisms, which frustrates the integration of DRR in the development programming of Commission Delegations (see pages 18 - 19).

- DG ECHO has the potential to play a much greater *advocacy role*, both within the Commission and externally, but is currently constrained by lack of policy, staff capacity and knowledge, and well-documented evidence, including cost-benefit analysis (*see page 39*).
- The collation of *learning, documentation of good practice and dissemination* to implementing partners, other EC directorates (notably DG DEV, DG RELEX and AIDCO), as well as to Member States and more widely to other DRR stakeholders and governments has, so far, been weak (*see page 36*).
- There is *limited coordination* with partners on DRR and few documented efforts to bring together partners following a response Decision, unlike DIPECHO which has regular meetings with partners. This lack of pro-active coordination is a lost opportunity in terms of promoting good practice, sharing lessons and discussing solutions (*see page 36*).
- To date the potential impact of climate change for increased risk and changing patterns of vulnerability has only been referred to in DG ECHO documentation. Concerted effort is required to improve the understanding and analysis of *climate change adaptation* in DG ECHO programme design and its likely impact on risk and vulnerability (*see page 17*).

Main conclusions and recommendations

10. The most significant conclusions and the corresponding *strategic* and *operational* recommendations of the evaluation are as follows:

- Ci.** **DG ECHO's current lack of a DRR policy and implementation guidance is constraining efforts to integrate the issue into humanitarian actions. Addressing DRR in a more systematic way will strengthen the coherence of DG ECHO actions with the five HFA priority areas:**
- Ria** DG ECHO should **finalise its policy on DRR** as soon as possible; this policy should be in alignment with the Hyogo Framework for Action priorities, as well as being consistent with ISDR definitions. The new policy should have high level senior management endorsement, including clarification of financial and legal implications for operational interventions. This policy should be in close harmony with the **Communication** currently being developed by DG DEV. [Strategic]
- Rib** The DRR policy should be accompanied by an **implementation strategy** developed by DG ECHO headquarters, for the dissemination of the policy, both internally and externally. This should provide for the *practical integration* of DRR with a focus on good programming and supported by clear guidelines for each major sector. This can best be represented or translated as: '*risk informed humanitarian action*'.
- Ric** DG ECHO should **clarify and simplify terminology** by immediately and singularly adopting the term '*Disaster Risk Reduction*', for *all* activities under preparedness, mitigation, prevention, response and recovery. [Strategic]
- Rid** Further research and dialogue should take place between DG Environment and DG ECHO to discuss the likely impact of **climate change** in terms of increased disaster risk and vulnerability. A projection of what this may mean for all regions and

countries will allow DG ECHO to adopt suitable strategies for intervention. [Operational]

Cii Current funding frameworks for DRR in response activities impose constraints. There is a significant gap between DG ECHO financing and other EC Services for the transition of DRR into longer-term recovery and rehabilitation.

Riia DG ECHO should explore possibilities with other EC services for **making funding instruments more cohesive** across the Commission. This may include modification of existing instruments (e.g. the Stability instrument), or establishing a new funding instrument for risk reduction in order to bridge the transition of DRR along the LRRD continuum although this will need support from other EC services, notably DG DEV, RELEX and AIDCO. [Strategic]

Ciii DG ECHO staff lack capacity and knowledge for some skill-sets relating to DRR, but there is willingness to learn the 'how to'.

Riiaa DG ECHO should develop and deliver a **DRR training package** for staff, which is practical and evidence-based. The development and provision of tools and guidance, including the sector inventories produced by this evaluation, could assist with this initiative. [Operational]

Riiaib DG ECHO should consider the establishment of new **Regional DRR Advisor positions** (e.g. utilising Technical Advisers with DIPECHO experience) who may be required in some regions, with a phase out over time. These positions could also assist with the documentation of lesson learning, good practice and advocacy to other DRR stakeholders. These positions should be viewed flexibly and could include using DIPECHO Regional TAs as wider DRR advisors, leaving DIPECHO programmes to be managed by field based TAs, which would also enhance cross-fertilisation between preparedness and response [Strategic] (Note: a step in this direction has already been taken by the DG ECHO Unit responsible for Asia and Latin America.)

Civ In spite of the lack of institutionalisation of DRR within DG ECHO, there is evidence of considerable practical application in humanitarian response. However, the level of integration appears to vary considerably with type of funding decision and attitude and familiarity with DRR concepts of both ECHO staff and partners.

Riva DG ECHO should continue to **promote the integration of DRR** into all humanitarian actions - according to the new policy and implementation strategy; this should include lesson learning and sharing across the regions. In particular, DG ECHO should promote the consideration of DRR in the **early relief phase** where appropriate and possible (e.g. in Primary and Emergency Decisions). [Operational]

Rivb The evaluation team recommends that DG ECHO should consider the following elements of DRR in humanitarian actions by:

- Incorporating risk analysis into needs assessment frameworks and implementation;
- By making existing humanitarian interventions more risk-informed during planning, design and execution;
- Promoting relevant, adequate and consistent standards for humanitarian response (Sphere and other);

- Promoting support for livelihood recovery early on in the relief phase cycle;
 - Ensuring that any response action does not undermine local coping capacities;
 - Considering recipients of aid as active stakeholders in the process of risk reduction;
 - Supporting capacity building of local partners and local government authorities;
 - Ensuring the inclusion of risk analysis from the relief phase into the post-disaster needs assessment process (integrating DRR into LRRD)
- Rivc** DG ECHO should build in criteria to the FPA stating that partners must show a demonstrated capacity for integrating DRR into their response operations. Where appropriate, DG ECHO should encourage **partners to invest their own resources** for developing a DRR policy for humanitarian actions and design appropriate training packages and roll out. [Operational]
- Rivd** Where appropriate and feasible, DG ECHO should encourage partners to **strengthen capacity building of local and district level authorities** in order to ensure that local actors are better prepared and respond more effectively to small-scale, localised disasters. This will also ensure that impact is scaled-up. [Operational]
- Cv** **There is a growing consensus among project partners that increased focus on early inclusion of livelihood support may be the most effective way of mainstreaming DRR in response.**
- Rva** DG ECHO should ensure that support to a diverse range of appropriate **livelihood options** is given greater consideration from the onset of the disaster response operations. [Operational]
- Cvi** **There is limited evidence of coordination of partners by DG ECHO around DRR in humanitarian response and lost opportunities to promote good practice and lesson learning.**
- Rvia** DG ECHO should ensure **better coordination of DRR action among partners** around funding Decisions. For example, pre- and post workshops for each Decision (similar to those undertaken by DIPECHO before calls for proposals) could be used to discuss DRR opportunities. This could include discussion of applicable standards and sharing of good practice. [Operational]
- Rvib** DG ECHO should **improve documentation and dissemination** of DRR action and of good practice. **Decision outcome reports** could provide the global mechanism for this (following the 2002 guidelines); conclusions and lessons learnt in terms of successes in DRR for each Decision could be discussed by partners and recorded in the reports. [Operational]
- Cvii** **The cost-effectiveness and efficiency of integrating DRR into DG ECHO-funded humanitarian actions is not well understood internally, nor by many implementing partners. To date the evidence for the cost-benefit of DRR investments in humanitarian response is limited, but the inclusion of DRR elements as recommended above do not imply heavy additional costs More evidence would help DG ECHO in advocacy with other humanitarian donors, as well as with broader EC Services.**

- Rviiia** DG ECHO should consider supporting partners to conduct field-based research studies on the impact of DRR interventions, as well as the additional costs (and cost savings), i.e. **cost - benefit analysis**. These studies should attempt to measure both immediate short-term risk reduction (within the cycle of a response) and the impact of risk reduction on future events (through longitudinal case studies). [Operational]
- Rviiib** **Indicators appropriate for DRR** during response are currently being tested by a number of agencies and learning from this experience should be applied by DG ECHO and included in brief guidance notes with the Single Form and in the Decision guidance notes. [Operational]
- Cviii** **Advocacy requires both good analysis and a well-coordinated strategy. There has been some progress in advocacy for DRR by DG ECHO and its partners, but it has not been carried out systematically.**
- Rviiia** Once developed, DG ECHO should use its new DRR policy and the DRR Communication from DG DEV to develop **advocacy messages** promoting the effective integration of DRR into all programmes. These could be global, regional and country specific and could target a range of audiences, from implementing partners, to national and local government authorities and civil society. [Operational]
- Rviiib** DG ECHO should play a more formal role in **advocacy towards the rest of the EC**. This could include bolstering the work of the inter-service working group on DRR at Brussels level, and encouraging workshops and meetings at country level to include the review of DRR-related issues for: **Country Strategy Paper** development, joint advocacy to Government, and influencing regional bodies, e.g. in South Asia (SAARC) and in Southeast Asia (ASEAN). [Strategic]
- Rviiic** Given the scale of humanitarian funding, there is a strong role for DG ECHO in **championing DRR** amongst other donors, especially Member States, and selectively with national governments. This role could become more robust with a body of empirical evidence based on humanitarian practice and field research. [Operational]

1. INTRODUCTION

11. In the last three to four years the issue of disaster risk reduction (DRR)¹ has become increasingly important in both developmental and humanitarian policy and programming. Reducing the underlying vulnerability of people to disasters and increasing their resilience or coping capacities is now seen as an important element in poverty reduction and ultimately in sustainable development efforts. Following the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held in Japan in early 2006 many organisations, including multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors, have adopted DRR policies and there is a common international agenda in the form of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)².
12. As one of the world's largest humanitarian donor agencies, DG ECHO is increasingly concerned about incorporating DRR into its everyday work and recognises that more efforts can be made to reduce disaster risk, especially in the context of fast-moving emergency response operations. The recent European Commission Communication on the Consensus on Humanitarian Aid recognises the importance of improving DRR, both through better preparedness, but also *'through mainstreaming of this (DRR) dimension into EU humanitarian and development aid'*³.
13. Although DG ECHO has a long-standing programme of community-based disaster preparedness known as DIPECHO, to date the organisation has not developed a clear policy or strategy on DRR. However, this position is changing and the organisation is now embarking on a process of consultation and seeking to clarify its own position on this important issue in order to improve the way in which humanitarian assistance is delivered. At the same time as DG ECHO is working to develop a policy on DRR, there is a Commission-wide consultation process, together with external partners and Member States, led by DG DEV to develop a Communication on DRR⁴.
14. It is within this context that the Evaluation Sector of DG ECHO commissioned this evaluation to explore the issue of mainstreaming of DRR in the funding of humanitarian actions. The evaluation was managed by Aguaconsult⁵, a UK-based consulting firm, and took place between February and May 2008.

2. OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Global objective

15. The evaluation is intended to assess the mainstreaming of DRR components into different relief sectors (e.g. health, shelter, water and sanitation, livelihoods and food security) and at different stages in the relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction phases, whilst also differentiating between different types of hazard and their primary characteristics (i.e. speed of on-set, scale, frequency, predictability)⁶. Unlike a conventional evaluation exercise, it is not intended to assess the success of individual projects, nor the performance of specific DG ECHO implementing partners. Rather it is a thematic evaluation focussing on mainstreaming DRR, which by definition also includes an

assessment of how far the concept is commonly understood and applied across DG ECHO itself.

16. At the briefing meeting held in Brussels prior to the start of the field work it was agreed that the evaluation would focus on humanitarian actions over the past few years and review current actions in the field (e.g. Primary Emergency, Emergency, *Ad Hoc* and Global Plan funding decisions). DIPECHO programmes were therefore not the direct focus of the evaluation. However, given the strong linkages, and especially considering that many DIPECHO partners are also humanitarian response partners, the lessons and experiences of DIPECHO have been taken into account to inform the evaluation where relevant. The evaluation also addressed the linkages between mainstreaming DRR interventions in DG-ECHO funded projects with the actions of other EC long-term funding instruments and other development partners.
17. In addition to this assessment of humanitarian response actions, the evaluation contract includes the production of a draft inventory, or checklist, specifically as a resource for DG ECHO staff. This provides an overview of relevant components or good practice for better integrating DRR into the design of emergency relief operations. This inventory is contained in a separate report submitted to the DG ECHO Evaluation Sector. It was agreed at the briefing meeting that this output would be presented by sector as the primary level of analysis, and focus on practical advice, in the format of questions, checklists and examples of good practice or case studies. It is intended as a working draft to be taken forward by DG ECHO internally in the first instance and modified where necessary.

2.2 Methodology

18. The methodological approaches to the evaluation of mainstreaming DRR into relief operations and advocacy opportunities included the following:
 - **Policy and project documentation and literature review:** an assessment of all relevant internal documentation, including past evaluations of DG ECHO's humanitarian response operations and approaches to DRR, review of relevant evaluations and associated documents from other Directorates;
 - **Interviews with DG ECHO and other relevant DG staff:** at headquarters and regional and country offices, to assess current understanding of DRR and views on DG ECHO's role and capacity to advocate for the mainstreaming of DRR into humanitarian response;
 - **Interviews at country level:** with a range of actors in each country, including DG ECHO field staff, implementing partner staff, EC Delegation staff, Member State donors, national authorities with responsibility for emergency response and Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies and project beneficiaries;
 - **Targeted field visits:** visits to project sites of either current or recent response actions funded by DG ECHO to assess the mainstreaming of DRR in response and recovery actions;

- **De-briefings at field level:** after each country visit the team provided feedback on preliminary findings and outputs in the form of a de-briefing meeting with DG ECHO staff and other stakeholders.
19. The evaluation team started the process with an intensive week of meetings in Brussels with staff from policy units, geographic desks (A/1, A/2 and A/3), as well as legal and financial staff (B/1 and B/2) within DG ECHO. The team also spoke with external Brussels-based agencies and made a short visit to Geneva (see Annex II for the list of agencies and organisations visited). The evaluation team then visited ten countries, with field visits taking place in Bolivia, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya and Uganda, as well as visits to DG ECHO Regional Support Offices (RSOs)⁷.
 20. The selection of countries was finalised in conjunction with DG ECHO operational desks and the Evaluation Sector, with additional inputs from the Food Security and Disaster Preparedness Sector (A/4). The rationale for country visits was to include a representative sample of types of hazard risk (floods, droughts, hurricanes and cyclones, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc.), as well as a range of emergency types – for example, both large-scale and small scale events, complex emergencies, rapid on-set events and chronic emergencies. The evaluation team also reviewed the full spectrum of DG ECHO financial decisions from Primary Emergency to Global Plans.
 21. Following the Brussels briefing and each of the seven country field visits the teams produced an *Aide memoire* or short summary document, which captured the main findings and analysis in each case and which served as an evidence base for comparing approaches to mainstreaming DRR across different regions and under different types of hazard risk, including complex emergencies.

2.3 Constraints

22. This evaluation is focused on assessing the success or otherwise of DG ECHO and partners in mainstreaming DRR into humanitarian response, and is therefore by its nature a global exercise; for example, there was high demand to include as many countries as possible in the study. However, the process has been constrained by a number of factors, mainly relating to evaluation budget ceilings, including:
 - Limited contact time in country for the teams;
 - Limited time for each sector specialist, who could only work in one region, thereby possibly leading to bias;
 - Lack of financing for a health sector specialist;
 - Country choice placing some restrictions upon the evaluation of certain contexts, notably DRR within complex environments;
 - Absence of certain key informants (both within DG ECHO, particularly in the case of the Bangladesh office⁸, and amongst other stakeholders, for example certain UN agencies) during the timing of the mission;
 - Visits to all DG ECHO Regional Support offices were not feasible nor were all technical staff present;

- Limited opportunities for dialogue with the beneficiaries of DG ECHO partner's projects.
23. In addition, because part of the evidence for this evaluation has been derived from desk-based reviews of examples (by examining past Decision Documents, partner proposals, DG ECHO monitoring reports, working documents and final reports), in some cases it has been difficult to obtain full details of good practice. Apart from the field visits, where the teams could directly see the results of these projects, it is also difficult to ascertain if in fact the interventions described have resulted in positive impacts in reducing risk.

3. INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY FINDINGS

3.1 DG ECHO and disaster risk reduction

24. DG ECHO is comprised of two main Directorates (A - Operations and B - Support to Operations), as well as a Policy Unit (01 – which includes policy affairs, strategy and evaluation). The relatively recently established 'Food Aid and Disaster Preparedness' Unit (A/4) is in the Operations Directorate, and was set up primarily as a means of receiving the large-scale EC food aid programme, which was transferred from DG AIDCO in January 2007. The DIPECHO programme has no formal institutional home, but rather responsibility is spread out across the operational desks and relevant desk officers, with regional DIPECHO Technical Advisers present in the Regional Support Offices (Dakar, Nairobi, Managua, Delhi and Bangkok). It is important to note that the DIPECHO TAs do not form part of the RSO structure and do not currently provide formal support to staff dealing with geographic areas of responsibility. To date there has not been any DIPECHO programming in Africa, although this is currently under review and a new programme is being designed. During the course of the briefing in Brussels, and based on subsequent meetings in the field, it was apparent that there is still a lack of internal clarity about where DRR sits within the current institutional structure of DG ECHO. For many staff respondents, DRR is directly equated with disaster preparedness and therefore by extension with the relevant operational desk and the DIPECHO focal person. Nonetheless, it is the A/4 Unit that is now taking a lead in the development of a new DG ECHO policy on DRR (see 3.3 below) and in negotiations with DG DEV on the development of a broader EC-wide Communication. However, the relationship between A/4 and the Policy unit (0/1) is not clear with respect to mandate and the development of the internal DRR policy; not all respondents were clear about the function and scope of work of the Food Aid and Disaster Preparedness Unit. This may be due to the fact that it is relatively new and is still in a process of 'bedding down' in terms of defining its own role vis-à-vis that of other Units.
25. DG ECHO incorporates the HFA as a reference in its humanitarian work, which provides a coherent approach to the broad range of activities and interventions across the five high-level priorities⁹. Addressing DRR in a more integrated and systematic way will strengthen the coherence of DG ECHO actions within these five HFA priority areas, including the examples as follows:

- Capacity building of DG ECHO partners and local government stakeholders (also in some cases, regional or national government) is in line with the HFA objectives 1 and 3.
- Work in community based preparedness and mitigation (DIPECHO) and other community programmes such as regional drought decisions directly supports HFA priorities 4 and 5.
- Strengthening preparedness and risk reduction in disaster response and recovery decisions through good programming supported by clear guidelines for each mainstreaming DRR in all major sectors will support HFA objective 2.
- DG ECHO is already working with key international partners, such as WFP, WHO, UNICEF and IFRC to ensure better preparedness through strengthened systems for stocking and distribution of relief items; these actions directly support HFA priority 5.

3.2 Legal mandate

26. The mandate for DG ECHO's humanitarian interventions is bound by the considerations established within the legal regulatory framework of the Council Regulation No. 1257/96 of June 1996. Article 2d) of the Regulation is the most often cited in the justification for including DRR measures in humanitarian actions, but it also the most contentious as it allows for a broad range of interpretation. This article states that the objectives of humanitarian aid shall be: *'to carry out short-term rehabilitation and reconstruction work, with a view to facilitating the arrival of relief, preventing the impact of the crisis from worsening and starting to help those affected regain a minimum level of self-sufficiency, taking long-term development objectives into account where possible'*. Further Article 2f) states that aid may be used to: *'ensure preparedness for risks of natural disasters or comparable exceptional circumstances'*.
27. In this context, one main challenge stands out; namely how far can DG ECHO effectively engage in efforts to reduce risk without going beyond its core short-term humanitarian mandate and thereby encroaching on development programming? If we consider the disaster cycle as a continuum, this question becomes ever more critical as relief moves towards rehabilitation and ultimately to development work (through the logical progression of linking relief, rehabilitation and development - LRRD). This is particularly pertinent when balancing risk reduction activities with response to slow onset disasters or with chronic emergencies when Global Plan funding may span over many years¹⁰. The critical question for increased emphasis on DRR on the part of DG ECHO therefore is where the boundary can be drawn between humanitarian funding and long-term development approaches, and how far DG ECHO risks pushing its mandate.
28. The legal framework of DG ECHO currently *does* allow for DRR to be financed, but the extent to which this can include substantive elements of risk reduction appears to be very much open to interpretation. It is perhaps the shelter sector, which provides the clearest example of *'mandate creep'*, in this regard. In disaster prone regions where shelter is inherently understood under Article 2 to provide temporary shelter, but where there is a clear imperative to *'build back better'* and ensure a meaningful reduction in future vulnerability, this can result in DG ECHO financing new house construction.
29. The grey area of interpretation around what constitutes risk reduction and what is encroaching into the realm of development programming is a constraining issue for DG

ECHO partners when considering the type of activities to include in their emergency response proposals and how to present these in such a way that they still 'fit' within the humanitarian mandate (see section 4 for further details).

3.3 Policy and strategy

30. Following on from the Hyogo Conference in 2006, an increasing number of both development and humanitarian organisations have adopted policies and implementation strategies for DRR, although putting these into practice has generally been a challenge and progress is patchy. Most organisations have adopted the conceptual definition of DRR as expressed by the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), which is the UN body responsible for promoting a culture of prevention around disaster risk and the coordination of the HFA. The following definition of DRR is utilised in this report (see also the Glossary of Terms):

Disaster risk reduction: the conceptual framework of elements considered with the possibilities to minimise vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society, to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development.

UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR)

31. At present DG ECHO itself does not have a dedicated policy, nor a comprehensive strategy, for DRR, but rather an orientation for disaster preparedness and prevention¹¹, which describes the possible areas of interventions across three main 'pillars', namely: the DIPECHO Programme, mainstreaming and advocacy. There is a strong emphasis in its approach and funding on preparedness, with mitigation only considered for small-scale, localised hazard risks. The HFA is referred to in documentation (e.g. in the annual operational strategy papers), but there is insufficient analysis of HFA objectives and it is not incorporated into strategy or operational frameworks.
32. This preparedness orientation document includes many elements of DRR, but the bulk of the analysis refers to disaster preparedness and assessment of DIPECHO experiences; the treatment of '*mainstreaming of DPP elements into DG ECHO's main operations*' and its advocacy work is minimal and reflects the somewhat *ad hoc* nature of efforts in these two areas.
33. The more recent Commission-wide communication document from 2007¹² outlines the Commission's approach to humanitarian aid, including a reaffirmation of its principles and adherence to the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative¹³, as well as making a much more specific reference to DRR. But this document still largely includes statements of intent only regarding the HFA and mainstreaming of DRR, rather than articulating a clear policy on the part of the Commission Services.
34. In terms of implementation strategies for DRR, the most important document is the annual DG ECHO Operational Strategy paper. Over the past five years there has been an increasingly explicit focus on DRR, although much of the text in these documents tends to be descriptive in nature. In 2007, 'Disaster Preparedness and DIPECHO' is mentioned as a '*horizontal priority*', but the strategy document focuses almost exclusively on DIPECHO, making only a passing reference to the need for paying: '*special attention to*

.....more ambitious risk reduction activities in the context of the HFA' and the promotion of DRR in development programmes by continued advocacy activities. Although in practice many aspects of DRR are being addressed through other mechanisms, such as the Regional Drought Decision initiative in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel Global Plan¹⁴, these linkages are not made in any systematic or explicit way in the Operational Strategy documents.

35. Despite the current lack of policy, and an almost one-dimensional focus on preparedness (through the successful and high profile DIPECHO programme), the situation with regard to policy articulation for DRR is changing. At the time of the evaluation briefing visit, the DG ECHO A/4 section had just initiated consultations, both internally and with implementing partners, as part of the process of drafting a dedicated policy on DRR; this is expected to continue throughout 2008 with a finalised product by the end of the year. This document is expected to address not only DG ECHO's position on DRR, but the linkages and opportunities for leverage across the EC more broadly. In addition to this effort on the part of DG ECHO, there is also a Commission-wide consultation process led by DG DEV to develop a Communication paper on DRR. The institutional incentive for other EC services to integrate DRR more effectively may become more apparent once the Communication is adopted.
36. DG ECHO is thus lagging behind many other humanitarian organisations, in terms of articulating a clear institutional policy, in line with the HFA and UN ISDR definitions. Internally, this lack of policy framework appears to limit the extent to which DG ECHO staff is able to promote the effective integration of DRR into humanitarian response operations.
37. The global discussion and focus on *climate change* as a driver of increasing disaster risk is now recognised by many DG ECHO staff and implementing partners as a priority issue. The rise in small and medium scale disasters has been linked to changing weather patterns and is likely to increase risk for vulnerable communities. However, despite this recognition there is currently a lack of analysis in existing policy as to how this is can be addressed through humanitarian response strategies.
38. Further, there is confusion within DG ECHO over the *terminology* used to describe DRR (as well as by project partners and other stakeholders). Various terminologies and concepts are used, including: DRR, disaster preparedness, mitigation, disaster management, as well as simply 'good practice'. Many of these terms are used in combination or interchangeably. Staff appear to be constrained in effective integration of DRR into humanitarian response by this confusion over language
39. Coupled with this definitional confusion, the term 'mainstreaming'¹⁵ is also a hindrance for many DG ECHO staff and implementing partners, who are overwhelmed with policy directives for 'mainstreaming' of many issues (e.g. environment, gender, HIV/AIDS, etc.). This can often result in a 'tick the box' only approach. The term is both difficult to understand and challenging to translate into languages other than English.
40. There are also differences in interpretation and usage of the concept of mainstreaming between different parts of DG ECHO. The term is used to describe both 'content

mainstreaming' (e.g. gender or indeed DRR) and 'organisational mainstreaming' (i.e. where programmes are implemented through the broader ECHO field office structure, such as the Regional Drought Decision, as opposed to the stand-alone programme of DIPECHO).

3.4 Budgetary frameworks

41. The parameters for funding decisions for investment in DRR are defined by the financial specificity of the three budget lines, namely *Humanitarian Aid*, *Food Aid* and *Disaster Preparedness*. In global terms, and ignoring a number of smaller sources of funding that are not part of the regular DG ECHO budget¹⁶, total financing for 2006 was approximately €70 million, of which some €250 million went to on Food Aid, €20 million to the DIPECHO programme with the remainder, and majority, going to humanitarian aid¹⁷.
42. In terms of Decision types, it is interesting to note that funding for Primary Emergency and Emergency decisions represents a relatively small proportion of total spending (these two Decision types amounted to only 8.5% of the 2006 budget). Meanwhile, *Ad Hoc* funding, which includes DIPECHO programmes, Food Aid and Thematic Funding, amounted to some 60% of DG ECHO's budget last year. The final category, Global Plans had almost four times the amount spent on emergency response decisions, and includes programmes that are relevant for DRR, such as the drought decisions.
43. DG ECHO has been granted significant privileges vis-à-vis other EC Directorates with respect to shortening financial procedures which allow for much more rapid disbursement of funds, which is justifiable in the case of humanitarian emergency response. While there is room for interpretation of the inclusion of DRR during humanitarian response programming, there is an inherent risk for DG ECHO that straying too far from classic life saving activities could result in the loss or further restriction of this flexibility.
44. In practical terms, this risk that DRR interventions may be seen to encroach too far along the development end of the spectrum is reflected by the fact that many implementing partners, and indeed some DG ECHO staff, are reluctant to include explicit DRR components in proposal documents out of fear of the projects being rejected. Because of this it is sometimes difficult to determine the extent to which DRR interventions are being financed, as they are in effect 'hidden'.
45. Current financing rules and systems for humanitarian response constrain the degree of investment in DRR activities. Improved complementarities and coherence for addressing DRR from the outset of a disaster response appears to be constrained by different types of funding Decisions and perceived limitations on use of funds. This situation is reflected in the limited examples of risk reduction seen in Primary Emergency decisions¹⁸ and general lack of explicit reference to DRR in most other Emergency Decisions, even though there is significant evidence of good practice observed in the field¹⁹.
46. However, there is also evidence that DG ECHO offices have accomplished positive results by using different funding mechanisms pragmatically to achieve common objectives in risk reduction for a region or country. For example, in Haiti where DRR

activities, similar to the ones funded under DIPECHO were included in an *Ad Hoc* decision to support recovery for people affected by hurricanes; similarly in Africa for drought risk reduction and in Sahel within the programme for reducing risk of nutritional crises.

47. There are currently significant gaps in terms of funding mechanisms between the phase-out of DG ECHO humanitarian response actions and financing from other EC services to support the transition of DRR into longer-term rehabilitation and recovery. The old instrument for rehabilitation within ECHO (reconstruction line) appears to have contributed to bridging this financing gap, but has been discontinued. There is, however, potential for the Instrument for Stability, a financial instrument under DG RELEX which is used to: “*respond urgently to the needs of country threatened with or undergoing severe political instability or suffering from the effects of a technological or natural disaster*” and thus may be utilised to undertake DRR activities, particularly in post-conflict situations (see also section 4.7).
48. This has resulted in a disconnect in financing mechanisms, especially for contexts where the lack of chronic emergencies, or underlying structural crises, means that financing under *Ad Hoc* or Global Plan Decisions is unlikely following on from an acute emergency (for example, in the case of housing stock rehabilitation or re-construction in Peru following the 2007 earthquake).
49. DG ECHO staff expressed the view that there was little evidence that the support given through Thematic funds for capacity building of UN agencies and by the International Federation has resulted in better preparedness for response and field level requirements for improved DRR interventions (e.g. funding for the development of regional hubs through capacity building and stockpiling emergency items, in Panama and Kuala Lumpur).

3.5 DG ECHO staff awareness and capacity

50. Currently, DG ECHO does not provide any form of significant or structured training for its staff on DRR related issues. Efforts to build awareness and capacity have so far been confined to thematic sessions at the annual Expert Seminars and the annual DG ECHO Partners' Meeting (2006 only). Many of the staff interviewed by the evaluation team voiced the opinion that whilst informative, such sessions are too general, focusing on conceptual definitions, without providing the practical, ‘*how to*’ guidance (these are short sessions, normally of half a day at the most and are not mandatory).
51. Part of the challenge in organising such training is the lack of Brussels based staff that has sound knowledge of DRR and also facilitation skills. In addition, there is a general reticence, on behalf of some management to spend even a small percentage of “*humanitarian funds*” on staff training and therefore such training has not, to date, been out-sourced.
52. At the field level, disaster preparedness is discussed in Regional Seminars organised by the operational units and in Regional Sub-Office meetings. The DIPECHO Technical Advisers assigned to these Offices are often considered as the focal point and provide

general support on DRR issues regionally and to country teams upon request, although no tailor-made training was evidenced by this evaluation team in the regions visited.

53. One mechanism for building awareness and disseminating learning is through the Working Group on DRR, which is similar to other such groups (e.g. *Aquarius* for water related issues and *Anopheles* for health) and operates both virtually and within Brussels. These groups have received recent high-level endorsement from senior management in DG ECHO and more formalised ToRs, but the DRR Working Group membership is still mainly comprised of DIPECHO practitioners and appears, so far, to have failed to have an impact in the sense of not drawing in more 'mainstream' DG ECHO staff.
54. A recent questionnaire organised by A4 (Food Aid and Disaster Preparedness Unit) to determine the current level of awareness about DRR reported that about a third of desk officers have '*limited or basic knowledge*', with a quarter reporting that they have a '*good*' knowledge. Among Technical Advisers the figures were found to be somewhat higher, with 38% reporting good knowledge and about a third having limited knowledge²⁰. A large majority of all staff surveyed expressed interest in receiving further training on DRR.
55. The findings of this present evaluation are very much in line with responses to this survey. Based on extensive interviews with DG ECHO staff in the field, the evaluation team found a similar picture of mixed levels of awareness and conceptual understanding of DRR. Many respondents were clear in terms of the basic conceptual tenants of DRR and the vast majority whole heartedly agreed with the principles (i.e. reducing vulnerability to future risk). However, the team uncovered confusion regarding the distinction between disaster preparedness, mitigation and DRR, with few staff able to provide practical examples of risk reduction in humanitarian action, i.e. the "*how to*" implement DRR measures in practice. This was especially true in the earliest stages of response and particularly to rapid on-set disasters, where it was generally considered inappropriate to undertake DRR activity. The team found evidence in most countries visited that some staff lacked knowledge to provide guidance to project partners as to what was feasible within a spectrum of DRR activities in a Primary Decision in response to different disasters. There is a perception that DG ECHO staff lack capacity or skill-sets relating to DRR, but there is also strong willingness to learn the '*how to*'.
56. There is currently a considerable workload on Technical Advisers, Desk Officers, Regional Support Offices and the Sector Support Team staff. Furthermore, some DG ECHO staff almost had a fear of taking on, or 'mainstreaming' DRR, as it is often perceived as potentially increasing workloads and portfolios of already over-stretched staff.
57. At present, Technical Advisers spend much of their time on administrative aspects of managing the project partners. Their main function therefore remains monitoring and reporting against individual projects, limiting the time and opportunity to provide technical guidance and promote DRR, for bigger picture analysis or encouraging lesson learning and sharing amongst partners. The new Single Form²¹ is considered to have potential to improve the overall quality of responses and lesson learning by freeing up

Technical Advisers from their administrative burdens to consider more strategic issues. However, this will depend on the application of instructions for the new form.

58. Locally hired programme staff (Programme Assistants) are well placed to address and promote DRR (i.e. they generally know the local context and often have continuity in post). However, both these staff and Technical Advisers are contracted rather than permanent and as such their inputs on DRR can be limited or go unrecognised.
59. DIPECHO Technical Advisers are an obvious and relevant source of knowledge and experience on DRR for DG ECHO Technical Advisers, however, they are generally based at the Regional Sub-Offices and make regular and busy monitoring visits to the country having little time for adequate dialogue and support to DG ECHO Technical Advisers.

3.6 Existing tools and frameworks

60. Despite the absence of a comprehensive DRR policy and an implementation strategy, there are a number of tools and frameworks already in existence which address this issue either explicitly or by including the potential for DG ECHO staff to do so through their own initiative. Some of these are formal, sanctioned documents and others are working papers; they can be grouped into several categories as follows:
- i. **Administrative documents:** such as the revised Single Form (November 2007) which refers to DRR under the general section on Mainstreaming (5.3 under Cross-cutting issues) and the various drafting guideline documents for different types of Decisions²²
 - ii. **Guideline documents:** such as the current work being carried out to define roles and responsibilities for DG ECHO's Enhanced Rapid Response Capacity (2008), which includes a set of benchmarks, one of which highlights DRR as a relevant issue for inclusion in emergency response programming;
 - iii. **Informal resources:** such as the outputs and working papers developed by the various working groups (health, water and sanitation and DRR), as well as materials developed through regional offices, such as a guide and recommendations for disaster preparedness intervention and the draft paper on mainstreaming disaster preparedness and mitigation in water and sanitation interventions in humanitarian programmes²³;
 - iv. **Sector guidance materials:** such as the water and sanitation review from 2005 which includes detailed technical resources on many aspects of risk reduction.
61. Based on interviews with DG ECHO and implementing agency staff and field observations, it is apparent that some of these tools are not detailed or precise enough to provide sufficient clarity on appropriate risk reduction activities in humanitarian action. In addition, they are not being applied consistently across the organisation, relying more on the interest and motivation of the individual or local office culture, rather than any adherence to a set standard.
62. For example, both the 2006 and 2007 Emergency Decision documents for the flooding response in Bolivia mention 'mainstreaming' of DRR into humanitarian actions as an important element and they also both specify that priority will be given to partners that

demonstrate mainstreaming of DRR in their emergency relief proposals. However, the proposals for these Decisions included limited discussion or analysis of mainstreaming DRR. Similarly the *internal monitoring documents* do not include any analysis to differentiate between those proposals that included DRR and those that did not mention the subject.

63. Conversely, both the Emergency Decision and subsequent *Ad Hoc* Decision documents for the earthquake response in El Salvador in 2006 explicitly stated that DRR should be mainstreamed as far as possible, both through stand-alone disaster preparedness components and '*the adoption of a risk reduction approach in the humanitarian response activities*'. All resulting proposals for the *Ad Hoc* funding decision included good evidence of mainstreaming risk reduction activities, specifically in the shelter sector (including anti-seismic and wind resistant designs and improved materials), as well as associated rehabilitation activities such as ensuring slope stability, terracing, retaining walls and proper drainage around new houses.
64. This evaluation found evidence of good 'informal' initiatives being undertaken by various individuals and field offices to improve guidance on integrating DRR (e.g. disaster preparedness intervention and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector mainstreaming from the Andean office; recent efforts to develop DRR guidance for the WASH sector by the Sector Support Team). However, due to the lack of a formalised policy framework to link these innovative outputs, there is limited recognition or acknowledgement of these initiatives and therefore of take-up across DG ECHO as a whole.

4. OPERATIONAL FINDINGS

4.1 Mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction

4.1.1 Evidence of DRR or good practice

65. Many of the humanitarian response actions reviewed in this evaluation being funded by DG ECHO have included elements of DRR. There are differences in the background and approach to how DRR has evolved across global regions, but in all countries visited by the team there was some evidence of good practice, although this was seen to be more limited in Uganda and Bangladesh.
66. In many, if not the overwhelming majority, of cases these interventions are not explicitly linked to, or labelled as, 'risk reduction' activities by practitioners, but are more often understood as '*good humanitarian practice*'. For example, in the Dominican Republic, although none of the Primary Decision proposals mention DRR explicitly, either as a stand-alone component, or highlighted within sector response activities - elements of good practice were evident in all three of the NGO proposals, in so far as they addressed immediate risk reduction needs; i.e. vector control and epidemiological surveillance (OPS), water, sanitation and hygiene activities (Spanish Red Cross and Intermón Oxfam). It was therefore apparent that staff at field level are in fact including many elements of risk reduction in humanitarian response actions, but not necessarily recognising or articulating them as such. Furthermore, there appears to be mixed understanding among

partners about what is meant by DRR and its relevance to emergency response operations. In many cases DRR was equated with good practice, or common sense; a few interlocutors were able to provide concrete examples.

67. There was much discussion at all levels on what constitutes good practice in DRR and, it was found that some agencies are undertaking elements of DRR but not calling it that specifically. A positive trend is that there is an overlap in many themes: *Do No Harm*, protection, gender, DRR and HIV/AIDS. A good analysis of one may include a good response to another; e.g. the placement of water points within a camp or community. Incorporating DRR into humanitarian response, particularly into the relief phase, is considered important because it helps to ensure that existing risks are not exacerbated and that new vulnerabilities are not created. Additionally, establishing risk reduction as a priority in the initial response is key for the design of subsequent early recovery and rehabilitation interventions. The key feature is the combining of risk analysis during the needs assessment, to ensure the actions taken during the response phase contribute, where possible, to reducing vulnerability by considering the long term perspective and ensuring that coping capacities are not undermined. For example, in Indonesia, in their response to the Jogjakarta earthquake, Oxfam GB framed all their activities with the objective of mitigating risks and supporting local coping mechanisms.
68. The integration of DRR into humanitarian response was most evident in activities related to rehabilitation and recovery. Although there is some evidence of risk reduction in the immediate response phase (particularly relating to environmental health and control of epidemic diseases in displaced populations and social protection), many DG ECHO staff and partners find this the most challenging aspect of integrating DRR.
69. Integration of DRR by DG ECHO-funded projects is primarily manifested at community level, through capacity building, training and response actions. There is also evidence of significant interventions at the level of local and regional government and in a minority of cases even at national level (e.g. in Bolivia and Madagascar).

4.2 Factors affecting integration

4.2.1 Operational environment

70. There are a number of different operating environments that DG ECHO currently works in; these include:
- *Conflict situations* - some where DG ECHO staff are rarely, if ever, allowed access, (Eritrea); DRR integration is unlikely to be a priority for these countries;
 - *Protracted crisis* - requiring permanent DG ECHO presence over a number of years, (currently 16 Global Plans including Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda and Zimbabwe); DRR is increasingly being discussed in these contexts, and both DG ECHO and partners are proactively seeking to address DRR. (DRC and Sudan);
 - *Natural disasters* - both rapid onset one off responses, and increasingly cyclical slow onset floods and drought; limited evidence appears to show that DRR is further integrated in slow on-set disasters. As DRR becomes a more familiar concept for DG

ECHO staff and partners, there is greater potential to include it in large-scale sudden onset disasters;

- *Small-scale disasters* - which can be considered as a hazard event with a limited geographical scope and limited affected population, where it is not quickly evident that an external humanitarian response is required. However, due to the large number of such small-scale disasters (it is estimated that these account globally for 80% of the people affected by disasters) DG ECHO is increasingly involved²⁴; DG ECHO and partners see the biggest potential for integration of DRR in these responses; and
- *Forgotten crises* - DG ECHO also focuses on these, currently intervening in six countries or regions with 13% of the initial operational budget in 2007 (see DG ECHO Forgotten Crises Assessment, 2007 - a spreadsheet).

4.2.2 Scale, hazard and funding decision

71. There was varying opinion by staff as to the role of DG ECHO in responding to small-scale recurrent events, from those who considered that such disasters should be addressed by supporting agencies to better respond through the use of thematic funds, to those who see a role for DG ECHO making a bigger contribution. The team found evidence of successful integration of DRR in the response to smaller-scale, localised events that are cyclical (e.g. flooding in Bolivia) and good opportunity to integrate DRR in chronic events, as evidenced by the Emergency decisions in northern Kenya and in Madagascar.
72. In examining the response to one recent large-scale rapid onset event the team saw relatively little evidence of integration of DRR into the humanitarian response (e.g. of Bangladesh cyclone Sidr). One of the principal reasons for this appears to be because the scale of the needs and the life-saving imperative meant that the funding and human resource was focussed on core activities such as food and NFIs. Even though there is an innovative and widespread programme of technical support for the integration of DRR through the Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme in Bangladesh, the team saw limited evidence of conceptual clarity of DRR amongst DG ECHO partners in immediate response operations.
73. In Indonesia, in response to the Yogyakarta earthquake, two factors appear to have had an influence on the relative lack of focus on DRR during the planning for the response: firstly, the scale of the disaster and the need to respond immediately; and secondly the relatively few organisations that had presence on the ground in Yogyakarta before the earthquake, and therefore the fact that relatively few knew local contexts, risks, vulnerabilities, or capacities. The large-scale nature of both the event and the response to the earthquake appear to have limited the scope for inclusion of DRR for many agencies. Nonetheless, in Yogyakarta even though integration of DRR was lacking in the Primary Decision, there was strong evidence in the Emergency Decision responses in the shelter sector and proactive measures were taken in building earthquake-resistant transitional shelters by most of the partners.
74. The team saw a range of operating environments and global trends in this evaluation, but do not consider these as a sufficient basis for extrapolation to identify clear patterns. Nonetheless, on the basis of a limited evidence-base, the key determinant appears to be the *attitude and familiarity with DRR concepts* of both ECHO staff and partners. The type

of funding decision, together with the *scale of the disaster*, appeared to be bigger determinants in levels of DRR integration than either speed of onset, or type of hazard.

4.2.3 Complex emergencies

75. The evaluation team visited Uganda as part of the review, where the focus is on return and reintegration of those displaced during the 20 year conflict in the north of the country. Evidence from Uganda highlighted the limited knowledge that those working on conflict had regarding DRR. Traditionally emergency response has been compartmentalised into conflict or natural disaster resulting on a focus of one leading to the neglect of the other. UNOCHA Kampala has recognised this, and organised an orientation and knowledge sharing meeting on this issue focusing on preparedness and contingency planning. However, this is done through the commitment of the individual, outside of the remit for UNOCHA in Uganda which remains focused on the north. DG ECHO did respond to the floods in Uganda last year, but in general, Uganda is not seen as natural disaster prone.
76. Discussions with DG ECHO staff in the Horn of Africa regional office suggest that DRR is beginning to be considered as more of a priority in complex emergencies where natural resources are becoming overstretched or where conflict over natural disasters is one of the underlying reasons for the conflict. In northern Kenya, both conflict reduction and DRR principles are considered in most projects. Agencies included traditional methods for water collection and preservation during the rehabilitation phase to reduce further risk. (Islamic Relief, Danish Red Cross, Merlin). Wood depletion around refugee camps in Northern Kenya is being addressed through distribution of firewood and fuel efficient stoves to refugees, and alternative livelihood opportunities for host communities. This both lessens the tensions between the refugees and host communities, as well as ensuring that vulnerability to natural shocks, floods and drought is not increased for the host community through the depletion of the environment. The Global Plan for Sudan mentions the need to strengthen preparedness mechanisms in the country, and recognises significant concerns about the environment and water resource management and emphasises the need for: '*Do No Harm*'. Interventions are encouraged to mitigate conflicts over natural resources and to pave the way for early recovery. (Darfur, Sudan).
77. Global plans provide an instrument that allows for a more integrated and multi-sectoral humanitarian response to complex, large-scale protracted disasters. In 2007, there were 16 global plans, accounting for 36.6% of the humanitarian aid budget. Disaster risk reduction was not explicitly mentioned in *any* of the Global Plans that the evaluation team reviewed, although several had objectives to strengthen preparedness and consider mitigation of conflicts over natural resources, (Sudan, 2008). These findings should be considered with the caveat that the evaluation team only saw a very limited number of examples of DRR interventions in complex emergency contexts²⁵.

4.2.4 Regional contexts

78. From the field visits, meetings with partners, governments and other stakeholders, it is apparent that the situation varies from one country to another and across global regions. These differences appear to be based on the varying approaches taken by DG ECHO staff

(past and present), the types of partners and their own stage in conceptual understanding and practical implementation of DRR and the type and frequency of hazards addressed.

79. It is important to highlight the fact that these findings are based on visits to a limited number of countries, but as a broad generalisation, the regions appear to vary as follows:

- **Latin America and the Caribbean:** partners and DG ECHO staff generally has a high level of conceptual understanding about DRR (or *disaster risk management* as it is more commonly known in the region) with a strong emphasis on stand-alone disaster preparedness in response. There was a more limited integration into sectoral responses; DIPECHO programmes were present in the countries visited by the team and all partners also took part in DG ECHO response operations^{26 27}.
- **Horn of Africa:** evidence of strong integration in sector response operations (primarily food security), although this was not normally explicitly labelled as DRR; partners generally had more limited exposure to DRR concepts and were in an operating environment made more complex by chronic conflict situations (e.g. in northern Uganda, Sudan); there is no DIPECHO programme, although one is due to start in 2008 in southern Africa. Due to frequent droughts the case for improved DRR has been made more forcefully and programmes such as the Regional Drought Decision provides for substantial DRR action;
- **South Asia (Bangladesh) and Southeast Asia (Indonesia):** based on the evidence seen by the evaluation team there appeared to be **more** limited conceptual understanding within humanitarian response and less evidence of good practice in humanitarian response amongst partners in Bangladesh²⁸. Conceptual understanding was good in Indonesia and evidence of good practice was stronger, especially in the shelter sector which had been largely influenced by experiences gained by partners during the tsunami response operations.

80. These findings point to a **dual approach** to DRR, combining **mainstreaming of DRR in sectoral responses** on the one hand (notably shelter in Indonesia, food security in Kenya and Uganda and WASH in LAC), with **targeted DRR actions** on the other (such as provided by DIPECHO projects in LAC, and in Asia as well as through the Regional Drought Decision in the Horn of Africa). Both approaches were seen to be beneficial, although there does not yet appear to be a full realisation of the potential for greater mutual support where these have been combined.

4.2.5 The role of DIPECHO

81. In the countries visited, DIPECHO project partners were often the same for DG ECHO response actions. Where present, the DIPECHO programme clearly has had a profound influence on the uptake and level of conceptual and pragmatic understanding of DRR (particularly of preparedness and mitigation aspects) amongst such partners²⁹. In some cases (e.g. Dominican Republic) DIPECHO was described as the “*first line of defence*”. However, this evaluation found that generally the DG ECHO - DIPECHO interface is weak in terms of the linkage made by DIPECHO partners and the integration of DRR into humanitarian responses. Disaster preparedness experience is seldom translated over into response operations. This appears to be because experiences from DIPECHO projects tend to be ‘ring-fenced’ in conceptual terms and are normally managed by different sets of DG ECHO staff (those for DIPECHO based in Regional Support Offices whilst DG

ECHO Technical Advisers are in-country – steps are being taken to improve this in particular in Asia-Latin America), therefore limiting the uptake of approaches and learning across these institutional boundaries.

82. DIPECHO has been instrumental in promoting DRR in an environment where there are few other donors supporting this issue. However, whilst funding for the DIPECHO programme was increased in 2007 by the European Parliament (to €9.5m) it is questionable whether programmes in all regions will be able to absorb further increases in funding due to the lack of availability of in-country partners and their own absorption capacity constraints.
83. Despite the fact that DIPECHO programmes have achieved considerable learning through piloting, previous evaluations have highlighted that some aspects of documentation and dissemination of DRR lessons learnt by DIPECHO and its partners has been weak³⁰. Although the DIPECHO sits within DG ECHO, it appears that learning and good practice does not automatically flow across the DIPECHO programme and into broader DG ECHO practices.

4.3 Sector responses

4.3.1 Shelter

84. DRR mainstreaming is largely understood as commencing at a later stage of reconstruction. Progress has been made to integrate DRR into the reconstruction of permanent or transitional shelter. Good examples of appropriate designs and construction methods for reducing future vulnerability to natural hazards have included the following.

- Earthquake-resistant transitional shelters in Yogyakarta (Emergency Decision)
- Wind and flood resistant designs promoted through the Shelter Cluster for slow-onset recurrent flooding events (e.g. *Ad Hoc* Decision, Bangladesh)
- Wind and earthquake-resistant designs, coupled with improved and safer site planning and relocation (*Ad Hoc* Decision, El Salvador)

85. However, for the most part DG ECHO partners are still challenged by how to better reduce risk in shelter interventions in initial disaster response phase. Nonetheless there are good examples in Primary Emergency Decisions - notably Oxfam's cash-for-work for homestead-raising and Islamic Relief's good quality tarpaulin sheets for emergency shelter (in Bangladesh).
86. In one case, the shelter Cluster approach has had a positive effect on the effective promotion of DRR measures in designs with advice and inputs from local or national experts (universities and research centres, e.g. in Yogyakarta where university students worked with affected people to construct transitional shelters).
87. There is some evidence of successful integration of DRR through a range of approaches with the 'hardware' elements being further advanced (e.g. hazard-resistant construction, provision of tools) than the 'software' components (e.g. community level capacity building, awareness raising).

4.3.2 Water, sanitation and hygiene promotion

88. As with the shelter sector, the interventions to support DRR in the WASH sector have generally been more prominent and successful in the rehabilitation and recovery phases. In particular, the risk-proofing of water and sanitation infrastructure (e.g. raised tube-wells and latrines in flood-prone areas, reinforced construction in areas of high volcanic activity and risk-aware siting of facilities). Increasingly DG ECHO is addressing risk reduction in relation to WASH services in chronic drought situations through more integrated and holistic approaches (e.g. through the recent *Ad Hoc* Regional Drought Decision).
89. Despite not specifically being addressed as DRR in all cases, progress has also been made in reducing risk across other phases of humanitarian response including:

- Immediate relief, largely through ensuring water quality, distributing water treatment kits and improving environmental sanitation conditions in shelters and camps (e.g. Emergency Decision in Bolivia and Global Plan, Uganda, 2006)
- Improving water resource management and thereby reducing environmental stress and the likelihood of conflict in semi-arid and arid areas (Global Plan, Uganda 2006)
- Focussing on the software elements of risk reduction, by integrating public health and hygiene education, which contribute to the reduction of water and faecal-related diseases such as cholera, typhoid, as well as others, such as malaria. (*Ad Hoc* Decision, Kenya 2007 and Emergency Decision, Haiti 2007)

90. A common theme amongst partners is the extent to which these measures are specifically DRR actions, or how far they simply reflect good practice. At present this is a grey area, with a wide range of conceptual understanding on how to address risk reduction in the WASH sector. However, given the critical nature of the sector, particularly its significant impact on health and the lack of consistency in DRR actions in DG ECHO funded WASH interventions; there is clearly the need to have a more systematic focus to risk reduction.

4.3.3 Food security and livelihoods

91. The traditional *post-hoc* reaction to humanitarian disasters (i.e. food aid shipments) has eased problems in the response phase at the cost of increasing them in the recovery phase, largely by undermining local food markets while creating food aid dependency, thus compromising livelihoods and future food security. Most partners are well aware of these problems and have made efforts to overcome them, but they still persist most especially in conflict zones³¹.
92. Evidence from northern Kenya suggests that lives have been saved but not livelihoods. This is illustrated by the fact that in one pastoralist area in Kenya over the period 1968-2006 the human population quadrupled while livestock population remained virtually stagnant. In the process vulnerable people have lost their livelihoods and become permanently dependent on food hand-outs.
93. DG ECHO's emphasis in recent years on disaster preparedness has encouraged partners to develop innovative approaches to DRR during different phases of humanitarian response. Success has not been uniform across phases or partners, but there are some encouraging results:

- Construction of irrigated raised seed and vegetable beds above flood level in Bolivia to ensure food supply during drought/flood plus planting materials (Oxfam GB)
- Use of household economics to understand of livelihoods systems, how they are affected by disaster and hence what interventions are most appropriate (SC UK)
- In-country purchase of grain supplies for food aid (WFP)
- Providing disease-resistant planting materials for IDPs returning from transit camps (FAO)
- Brokerage role with local seed company to arrange contracts and provide guaranteed market for farmers in post-conflict situation (ACF).

4.3.4 Health

94. There is some evidence of integration of risk reduction activities in the health sector, particularly relating to capacity-building and contributing to improved capacity to respond, including contingency planning, at all levels:

- Training of Ministry of Health staff, community health promoters and local First Aid responders contribute to improved response (e.g. Islamic Relief and SCF UK, Northern Kenya, Emergency Decision 2005)
- Strengthening of information management systems and epidemiological surveillance (e.g. MERLIN, northern Kenya, Emergency Decision 2005, PAHO/PED, Emergency Decision, Bolivia)
- Raising awareness and provision of health education (e.g. various agencies incorporated health messages in their responses to floods in Bangladesh and as part of health and hygiene packages in responses in Northern Kenya)
- Improving legislation and regulations for health facility and hospital construction (e.g. ICRC, various Decisions, Kenya) as well as the provision of equipment and materials

95. There was also evidence of repair and rehabilitation of health facilities, although it is not always clear if these incorporated risk reduction specifically (except in the case of Jamaica where the PAHO/PED programme's rehabilitation of the island's only psychiatric hospital explicitly included DRR measures, through retrofitting of structural elements to withstand future wind loads).

96. DRR in the health sector can be addressed further within DG ECHO funded actions/financial decisions by exploiting the potential of cross institutional boundaries and collaboration with other major health organisations, such as WHO/PAHO and UNICEF.

4.3.5 Social Protection

97. DG ECHO has yet to clearly articulate its approach to social protection. Many Technical Advisers interviewed by the evaluation team consider that social protection remains the more traditional interpretation enshrined in the Geneva Convention. This was reflected in the fact that this evaluation found limited examples of social protection activities in the countries visited. In some countries there was little evidence of social protection measures being considered either by DG ECHO or its partners.

98. However, some good examples do exist, in a range of settings where efforts have been made to increase the social protection of certain groups to heightened risks following a disaster or emergency event.

- Reconstruction works in El Salvador were notable in including explicit and focused measures to reduce social and gender vulnerability and risk of health-related problems (e.g. Plan International - WASH facilities, fuel-efficient stoves, promotion of vaccination, re-location of single, women headed households to safer areas, the transfer of land title deeds)
- Training of communities in child protection by DG ECHO partners (World Vision, Northern Uganda; UNICEF - of social welfare staff, police officers, local government officials; CARE, Kenya on conflict management)
- The support of pilot activity for mitigation of wood depletion around camps and to minimise the risks to women who are often raped whilst collecting fire wood, (Tearfund, Darfur, Sudan)
- During relief distribution, water and shaded areas were provided for people waiting (ActionAid, Bangladesh); in addition, "safe areas" for lactating mothers and their children were provided as well as "child friendly spaces" and children's centres to protect children during times of emergency (Plan International).

4.4 Appropriateness, impact and cost effectiveness

Appropriateness

99. Most interventions studied by this evaluation were found to be appropriate to the on-going response, were targeted at the most vulnerable and, in general, took into account the local cultural conditions and profile of the population, including accounting for the different needs of men and women. A positive sign is also that many DG ECHO partners stated that beneficiaries were starting to request activities and modalities that are in line with DRR (e.g. tool kits to repair the tube wells themselves, Bangladesh response to cyclone Sidr).
100. People living in any disaster-prone area have acquired considerable knowledge and technical expertise for managing risk. However, indigenous knowledge of DRR and people's coping strategies are sometimes overlooked and undervalued by agencies³². There were a few good examples revealed during this evaluation of project partners who have learnt from these experiences, (e.g. Oxfam GB and other agencies in Bolivia). This may not be the case for refugees or IDPS who have recently arrived in a disaster prone region, but will include those that have been there for considerable lengths of time (e.g. the Rohingya refugees from Burma who have been in Bangladesh for 16 years). DG ECHO was found to consistently encourage project partners to involve beneficiaries even during early response.
101. Several partners highlighted the importance of ensuring sufficient time and engagement with local people affected by disasters. This has resulted in a number of initiatives in DRR being taken up by project partners, thereby helping to ensure the appropriateness of response. For example, in Bangladesh and elsewhere a number of partners have benefitted from local people providing guidance on the raising and extension of tube wells; in Jogjakarta after the 2007 earthquake, local people also provided invaluable knowledge on the use of local, traditionally used construction materials subsequently employed in the design of resilient shelters. However, too great a reliance on local implementing partners may pose additional challenges and more careful monitoring, to avoid "traditional" top-down approaches to relief, maybe required (e.g. as noted in Bangladesh by this evaluation team and recorded the Oxfam GB review).
102. Targeting in some incidences was poor, e.g. in Bangladesh, where partners delivering assistance often found it difficult to select beneficiaries for relief - particularly

challenging for local non-government organisations who had previously carried out development work in the same villages. After Sidr, few project partners directly implemented emergency responses, the majority funding local NGOs³³, an Oxfam GB review concluded: *“considering the fact that the vast majority of assistance programmes ..are implemented by local actors, international donors and aid agencies have not invested adequately in strengthening these frontline responders in disaster-prone areas. More efforts are needed to build these organisations’ capacity especially in terms of beneficiary selection, the application of international quality standards such as the Sphere standards³⁴, and effective contingency planning³⁵”*. This is in line with the findings of this evaluation³⁶.

103. In addition, in some contexts there was limited evidence of lessons learned from previous responses in terms of suitability of standardisation (e.g., of food packages, household kits, First Aid kits, etc.), for example, in Bangladesh in the Sidr response operations, standardising food packages proved to be difficult since many partners received funding from multiple donors. Coordination efforts through the Cluster on standardisation are starting to address this issue. Also sectorally there are specific challenges, for example, in the WASH sector, the issue of standardising latrine specifications with partners to provide less expensive units without compromising sanitary standards has often proved challenging; there are examples too of poor risk reduction measures being undertaken due to a lack of technical know-how and technical rigor in implementation.
104. In some cases, it was found that DG ECHO staff and many partners consider that much of DRR is common sense, with technical know-how built in. However, agencies need to be more aware of what technical expertise is required in order not to undermine DRR activities³⁷. For example, in Uganda, Oxfam GB shared evidence of the poorly thought through implications of “risk reduction” in humanitarian action, where significant, long- lasting damage had been done to the aquifers in the northern part of the country by inappropriate and large scale drilling of tube wells.
105. There is a growing consensus globally among project partners and other major stakeholders in DRR that increased focus on capacity building and early inclusion of livelihood support may be the most appropriate and effective way of mainstreaming DRR in response: *“the phases of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction following a disaster are windows of opportunity for the rebuilding of livelihoods and for the planning and reconstruction of physical and socio-economic structures, in a way that will build community resilience and reduce vulnerability to future disaster risks”* (UN Habitat, 2005³⁸). DFID discussing the need to reduce vulnerabilities in their DRR policy³⁹ state: *“A key element is to make lives and livelihoods disaster resilient. This is in part about protecting existing livelihoods. For example ensuring that assets, such as harvested grain, are protected from floodwaters. It also includes diversifying livelihoods”*.

Impact

106. There is currently limited use of indicators for measuring the impact of DRR in humanitarian response by DG ECHO and its implementing partners⁴⁰ - the short time frame of Decision funding periods and the nature of emergency response actions will always present challenges in terms of measuring success. There are limited initiatives to

document good practice in DRR; one such case is a Red Cross response in Mozambique in which preparedness and capacity building has been well documented in a TV documentary, but these are the exceptions.

107. There were some clear examples noted by this team where risk analysis and reduction interventions were shown to have a positive impact. In the LAC region, an improved result after humanitarian actions funded by DG ECHO included both structural (e.g. seismic resistant housing) and non-structural (e.g. increased capacity of municipal, regional and even national level capacities). However, as there are no in-built mechanisms to adequately measure the impact of these projects it is often difficult or impossible to determine longer-term success.

Cost benefit analysis

108. The question of overall cost implications for integrating DRR into response actions is not yet well understood internally within DG ECHO nor by many of its implementing partners. Most, if not all, DG ECHO implementing partners do not maintain detailed costings on the additional inputs required to address reducing risk in emergency response operations, where these have been included. There are some attempts to gauge the additional costs and benefits to risk-proofing rehabilitated infrastructure (particularly in the shelter and WASH sectors); the frequently cited cost differential is between 10 and 20% of the basic costs of rehabilitation or reconstruction, but this does not appear to be based on any significant empirical research.
109. One specific case of structural mitigation of a health facility in Jamaica carried out by PAHO/PED (the PAHO emergency programme) using DG ECHO Emergency Decision funding has been well documented, showing the additional costs for retro-fitting against future hurricanes and storms amount to 13% of the reconstruction costs.
110. Other examples of economic analysis exist within and outside of DG ECHO, including documentation of economic rates of return from risk-proofing small-scale infrastructure, but these are limited in scope (e.g. a DIPECHO project supporting resilient house design in Viet Nam). External studies carried out by other agencies such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the ProVention Consortium, the UK's Department for International Development, the USA Federal Emergency Management Agency and the NGO Tearfund from the UK all indicate a strong cost-benefit for inclusion of DRR in a range of developmental and recovery contexts.
111. However, even these studies often focus on the 'hardware' elements of sector response (e.g. higher quality cement, more reinforcing steel, etc.), but there is not an increasing recognition that much of the integration during the relief phase will be in the 'software' aspects. These include activities such as proper risk analysis and planning, messages to the affected population, involvement of the local partners including capacity building of local authorities, many of which often do not incur significant additional costs. For these reasons, as well as the wide variation in input costs and capacities of implementing partners, it is not feasible, nor particularly helpful, to attempt to calculate the 'additional' cost requirements to address DRR. In many cases the additional costs are represented only by taking the time and attention to assess risk as part of DG ECHO's everyday response work. In other cases, there may be some additional costs to ensure

more robust design, construction materials and mitigation works. Even in these cases the order of magnitude of such additional costs can be considered as relatively low.

4.5 Partners, coordination and the cluster system

International NGO Partners

112. DG ECHO's efforts to integrate DRR into humanitarian actions is determined to a large extent by the performance of its partners and has been most effective where there is an enabling environment - that is to say existing knowledge and capacity in DRR, experience in both development and humanitarian work and familiarity with the area, local population and government. These partners are sometimes those of DIPECHO, but not always⁴¹. This principle also extends to local partners who often tend to be less developed in terms of their knowledge and thinking on DRR.
113. There is a wide variation in capacity to address DRR, from agencies with limited understanding to those with fully-fledged policy and operational guidelines; a few agencies have even developed training materials (e.g. CORDAID and various Red Cross-Red Crescent National Societies). But even those partners that have a global policy commitment and resources for DRR exhibit varying capacities and are all at relatively early stages of implementation around the world (e.g. Plan International, CARE, and Oxfam GB). The majority of partners interviewed during this evaluation expressed interest in improving their capacity in DRR despite being at varying stages of the development and roll out of policies or guidelines.
114. With some regional variations (e.g. in Latin America, and specifically South America, where DG-ECHO response projects appear to work more closely with local and regional governments), most response actions reviewed during this evaluation tended to focus on partners working at the local level. The tendency to not engage more regularly with local government structures may be missing key opportunities to leverage the issue of DRR at scale.
115. There is an Inter-Agency Standing Committee working group on DRR and humanitarian action based in Geneva. During the 69th Working Group meeting⁴² the IASC discussed current priorities of organisations in implementing DRR in humanitarian action and recognised that humanitarian action can create, aggravate or even rebuild risk but can also help reduce risk when designed and implemented effectively. A consensus has been reached to ensure that at a minimum all responses are based on 'risk informed' humanitarian action.

UN partners

116. WFP is beginning to consider DRR in its analysis, assessments and monitoring of programmes. A new global Strategic Plan is currently under development, and will include increasing focus on restoring livelihoods, as well as lives as part of an emergency response. Strategic objectives on greater investment in disaster preparedness and mitigation will also be considered. While still in the early stages the evaluation team did see some evidence at field level of these objectives. WFP is trying to map seasonal livelihood events to inform decisions around selecting modalities and appropriate timing of assistance. It aims to identify the baseline resilience of communities and the

interventions which can be used to protect that baseline during crisis, and improve it during recovery (e.g. supporting fish ponds Northern Uganda, considering purchasing food directly from small scale farmers Kenya). Food for work activities have been used for ecological recovery (e.g. re-forestation in Dominican Republic, introduction and reinforcement of agro-forestry practices in Madagascar). These are largely carried out in conjunction with FAO.

117. The UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) has the global cluster lead on early recovery which focuses on livelihood support. In Kenya, UNDP has an integrated programme in Baringo district focusing on rehabilitation of pastoralist land, and promoting of peace in the area through introducing alternative livelihoods such as beekeeping (which is *not* funded by DG ECHO). BCPR is also undertaking a major global research study into the interface and dynamics between conflict and disaster risk; the final outputs of the study should be available in late 2008.
118. There is evidence of considerable work being undertaken by UN agencies in the area of preparedness and contingency planning. UNOCHA globally aligns itself with Priority 5 of the HFA. In Uganda UN OCHA is taking a proactive role in promoting DRR amongst the NGOs and to the government, recently holding an orientation and knowledge sharing meeting on this issue. UNICEF is providing technical support at district level to develop contingency plans for disaster response and aims to get the financial buy-in to these plans from DG ECHO as a way of trying to ensure that this body becomes the coordinating body at crisis time. They will participate in National Government Preparedness Planning. (Kenya). UNICEF has also held a global consultation for the development of its policy for DRR in the education sector⁴³.
119. The evaluation team saw less evidence of DRR integration into sectoral response. In Kenya UN OCHA has developed a Humanitarian and Disaster Management Strategy that focuses on bringing the entirety of the UN's capacities together to "Deliver as One" through all the stages of disaster management. DRR will be included in this for 16 Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASAL) districts, although at present is limited to a concept note on drought risk reduction that is currently awaiting funding. However, UN OCHA sees a big gap in DRR and recovery in Kenya and believes that this is because there is no champion of these issues. UN ISDR is not operational in Kenya although they have a regional office; UNDP is involved more in development and conflict mitigation. Donors recently issued a Joint Assistance Strategy that neglected to mention DRR.
120. The Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Relief Programme (PED) of PAHO in the LAC region has long experience in disaster risk management and has built up strong risk reduction elements for humanitarian response that focuses on inclusion of mitigation measures during recovery phases particularly in health facilities. PAHO/PED have developed many innovative approaches in working to support Ministries of Health throughout the LAC region over many years and has recently developed a new five-year strategic plan for the period 2008 to 2014, which is firmly based on the HFA and DRR principles.

The cluster approach

121. The cluster approach⁴⁴ is part of the humanitarian reform programme aimed at ensuring a more consistent response to emergencies, but has taken much longer to implement than was anticipated. UN agency working practices need modifying, many agencies are still struggling conceptually with their new responsibilities, resourcing – both financial and human – is still a major obstacle, and the timetable is ambitious, with a roll out of the cluster approach in all countries with an humanitarian coordinator expected in 2008.
122. The Centre on International Cooperation and the Overseas Development Institute undertook an evaluation of the clusters in November 2007⁴⁵. The report concluded that the clusters were weak on inter-cluster coordination and that this was a hindrance to effective integration of cross cutting issues. For example, the decision by the cluster to encourage agencies to distribute roofs and encourage households to build their own structure led to large scale logging, and further destabilising of already vulnerable slopes, (Jogjakarta, 2007).
123. However, a key achievement of the clusters was the development or adoption of common standards, tools and guidelines for 10 of the 11 clusters, (although these are yet to be operationalised) and the ability of the approach to facilitate joint needs assessments.
124. DG ECHO contributed to the second global cluster appeal through the thematic funding, and will follow closely the second evaluation. This provides a good opportunity for DG ECHO to ensure that DRR is included, particularly as it is likely that this evaluation will include the broader humanitarian reform agenda. As the clusters become more universally accepted by UN agencies and NGOs, cross cutting issues including DRR integration could provide a mechanism to strengthen the linkages between the clusters.

IFRC and the Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies

125. In order to consolidate and update its disaster management policies, the International Federation has recently developed a draft disaster management policy and an associated disaster management strategy. The documents set out the main role of each Red Cross/Red Crescent National Society and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in the prevention, preparedness and reduction of risk from disasters. At its highest level of governance, as well as through its International Conference, the International Federation has made significant commitments to DRR, through these statutory meetings and also explicitly to address the impact of climate change. Disaster risk reduction, however, is not yet formally established as part of the policies of every National Society.
126. The European National Societies are important DG ECHO partners. When working in response operations in a disaster affected country with a National Society they are also able to draw down on their technical, material and financial resources for risk reduction activities. They are also to tap into regional and zonal offices of the International Federation for further guidance. Positive examples of risk reduction in response were

seen by the team, in which European National Societies worked closely to support National Societies (e.g. the Spanish Red Cross in the Dominican Republic).

Coordination with partners

127. While most of the partners interviewed consider DG ECHO to be an active and accessible donor, this tended to be on the basis of one to one between DG ECHO and the partner. The evaluation team found few examples of DG ECHO coordinating partners collectively around the issue of DRR in humanitarian response⁴⁶ for funding decisions either at the beginning of a response or at the end (note: the South America Andean office reported that they hold post-response Decision meetings with partners). This is in contrast to DIPECHO which has regular meetings with partners. This lack of pro-active coordination is a lost opportunity in terms of promoting good practice, sharing lessons and discussing solutions. The reasons for this again appear to be due to a lack of time and resources and a lack of prioritisation, but also linked to lack of internal staff capacity and knowledge of DRR.
128. Broader mechanisms for coordination beyond DG ECHO do exist in which risk reduction is addressed. Although not visited as part of this evaluation, the UN OCHA in Panamá hosts a regional coordination network called '*REDLAC*' (which is the Spanish acronym for risk, emergencies and disasters in the LAC region). REDLAC has a number of working sub-groups including one that addresses risk reduction.
- #### **4.6 Knowledge management and lessons learning**
129. Although DG ECHO emphasises good reporting by project partners, there is a dearth of collated lessons learned in-house on DRR and as yet no means to clearly summarise findings. Internal project assessments often do not provide a summary of the "big picture" (i.e. lessons learnt and recommendations for the future), nor do they appear to provide a means to ensure that such learning is disseminated across DG ECHO more broadly. The result is a limited institutional memory with examples of good practice becoming 'lost'.
130. The potential to replicate good practice in DRR within relief and recovery operations across regions has generally not been realised due to limited documentation of successful projects and innovative approaches. This evaluation found one example where an implementing partner had drawn on previous successful experiences with mitigation in the WASH sector, but this was not linked to systematic learning facilitated by DG ECHO (IFRC and Bangladeshi Red Crescent Society, 2008).
131. This gap in knowledge management reflects the lack of mechanisms within DG ECHO head quarters to gather and disseminate good practice and lessons learnt. For example, Decision Outcome Reports are not used to document DRR practices, which could be a useful record of achievement and lesson learning. The evaluation team only saw one example of such a report from El Salvador from an *Ad Hoc* decision in 2007, which was extremely useful in terms of pulling together lessons on DRR and provides an excellent repository of institutional learning for future reference⁴⁷.

4.7 Complementarities and synergy

132. To date, the absence of DRR policy within both DG ECHO and other EC services (notably DG DEV and DG RELEX) has meant that there has been no solid institutional framework or reference point from which to improve linkages between relief and development interventions at regional or country level (i.e. linking relief, rehabilitation and development). This lack of a framework has hampered efforts to maximise complementarities between DG ECHO actions on DRR and those of other EC Services (as well as those of other donors and international actors). A number of instances do exist where linkages have been established to transition DRR⁴⁸, but these are infrequent and are based more on individual motivation and contacts, rather than any systematic linkages.
133. DG DEV is currently leading the process of developing a Communication on DRR (along with DG RELEX, AIDCO and DG ECHO) whilst DG ECHO is engaged in parallel process to define its respective DRR policy. These initiatives should result in improvement of linkages across the EC. The DG DEV Communication paper (due to be adopted by the EC in October 2008) has already received considerable input from DG ECHO and is currently undergoing widespread consultation (both within the EC and amongst external stakeholders).
134. Currently there is still a gap between DG ECHO relief and recovery programmes and developmental funding by DG DEV and DG RELEX. Without appropriate *financing mechanisms* in place the transition between DRR in relief, rehabilitation and development will remain a challenge. DG ECHO staff has made significant individual efforts to fill this gap through close liaison with the Delegations in many countries, but this has mainly been based on personal relationships and 'informal' exchanges of information. In some cases these discussions resulted in the successful transition of DRR and linkages from DG ECHO to EC funding but these appear to be exceptions rather than the rule⁴⁹.
135. There is clear evidence of growing political will to develop policies devoting more funding to DRR amongst the Member States - the Issues Paper states that: "*ten Member States and the Commission are currently stepping up support for DRR in various ways, including through policy and institutional approaches as well as increased funding*" and calls for Member States and the Commission to work together on these issues. However, only a small number of Member States (e.g. DFID, SIDA and GTZ) have developed policies and guidelines on DRR that address aspects of humanitarian response. For most donors, this is still an area which has limited practical application and receives limited funding. The exceptions are DFID's policy to reserve up to 10% of funding for any major response for DRR and Luxemburg, who have also made a commitment to dedicate 5% of their budget for disaster response to DRR.
136. Nonetheless, there is considerable experience and commitment to DRR amongst the various Member States (undertaken bilaterally and by the Commission) under geographical and thematic programmes in all regions (many of the eighteen EU Member States fund DRR either from development or humanitarian aid budgets, or both). A concept paper under The Good Humanitarian Donorship has stressed the need to secure greater political commitment to DRR at all levels and across the relief-development

divide (July 2007). However, a Tearfund review⁵⁰ of donor progress with mainstreaming DRR has provided evidence that DRR is still caught up in the divide between relief and development programming. In terms of other major donors and their support to DRR, the evaluation has highlighted that whilst the majority have recognised and accepted the case for DRR, in practice its application remains elusive.

137. The EC's main funding instruments for DRR include⁵¹: geographic funding for Country and Regional Strategy Papers for all developing regions⁵²; Intra-ACP resources (the European Development Fund)^{53 54}; the Drought Preparedness Programme (the Regional Drought Decision in the Horn of Africa); and the global DIPECHO programme. In addition, the Stability Instrument (under DG RELEX) has considerable funding (over €2 billion for 7 years) and may be utilised after a major disaster for both emergency and interim response programmes - especially where needed for early recovery with a long-term perspective that “ensures a smooth transition to longer term development programmes”.⁵⁵ The stability Instrument perhaps holds the greatest potential within existing funding mechanisms on the development side to ease the transition of DRR-related activities following a response⁵⁶.
138. Other potential mechanisms for improving complementary include the longer-term development funding that maybe utilised directly for DRR activities accessed from DG DEV, DG RELEX, and EuropeAid/AIDCO. Although generally provided to national governments, DG ECHO project partners are also encouraged to apply (this often happens in small consortia, for example as in Bangladesh and Kenya)⁵⁷. Such funding instruments include the thematic programmes on Food Security and Environment and Natural Resources, the Non-state Actors/local government's thematic programme and the Research budget and the Joint Research Centre Instruments⁵⁸. Although regional funds are often available to prospective partners through the EC delegations (including allocations from the ACP Water Facility), take up appears to be limited by DG ECHO partners for DRR activities⁵⁹.
139. There was limited evidence of regular communication between DG ECHO and other Member States in the field (with the exception of DFID and SIDA) in terms of ensuring consistent DRR application in programming.
140. UN ISDR is a major stakeholder in DRR and one with whom DG ECHO is continuing to develop stronger ties and alignment, as the agency champions support for the implementation of the HFA. UN ISDR also receives support from a number of Member States. In addition, considerable funding is provided by Member States for the World Bank's Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery⁶⁰ and the Global Risk Identification Programme (GRIP)⁶¹. Support for DRR as facilitated by UN ISDR in its advocacy work with governments and civil society organisations will also potentially help to increase synergies, complementarities and more coherent approaches to DRR action, including in humanitarian response.
141. The trend towards **direct budget support** by other EC services is particularly challenging for DG ECHO in its influencing role in promoting DRR. Despite the commitment in December 2005 by Commissioner Louis Michel to include DRR in the 2007-2012 Country Strategy Papers (CSP), many countries had submitted the draft CSPs

before they received the guidelines encouraging them to include this as a cross-cutting theme⁶². In addition, the CSP is usually limited to a few key sectors. Where relevant, country Delegations need to be aware of the need to have adequate dialogue with the national governments to make DRR a priority, amongst many competing issues.

4.8 Advocacy

142. In the LAC region there was good evidence of DG-ECHO funded actions including advocacy to external players, especially government (e.g. local government for investment in flood protection infrastructure in Trinidad, Bolivia and central government coordination bodies also in Bolivia). Particular progress was noted under Emergency decisions in lobbying for greater investment in mitigation measures such as the donation of safe plots of land (Plan International, El Salvador) and improved shelter design (SC UK, COOPI and Oxfam GB in Bolivia, Plan International, ActionAid and Oxfam GB in El Salvador), the International Federation and PAHO/PED also lobby the Ministries of Foreign Affairs to improve humanitarian aid protocols in the Andean Region.
143. However, unlike recent examples of DIPECHO partners working together on advocacy related to disaster preparedness, there were far fewer examples of similar collaboration amongst DG ECHO partners focusing on humanitarian response. One good case is the recent formation of a loose consortium of NGO partners under the coordination of Oxfam GB in Kenya involved with the Regional Drought Decision. Advocacy for improved risk reduction in humanitarian response has also been galvanised around single issues, such as improved shelter design (Oxfam GB, Bangladesh) and the donation of safe land plots for displaced families (Plan International, El Salvador).
144. DG ECHO field staff has undertaken more 'up-stream' advocacy efforts on a range of issues, including DRR, with EC Delegations at country level. In general, however, DG ECHO staff stressed a sense of frustration with regards to these lobbying efforts. Despite the effort and time spent on this by some, DG ECHO staff generally felt that their concerns are not heard. The difference in funding modalities and cycles, including the increase in direct budget support and the lack of institutional prioritisation contribute to this lack of take-up of DG ECHO views and concerns.
145. However, in spite of these limitations, there are some good examples of successful DG ECHO lobbying for DRR inclusion into Country Strategy Plans and design of specific projects. For example in Haiti to address disaster preparedness and in Peru for investment in more seismic-resistant housing.
146. At headquarters level within DG ECHO, several "DRR -minded" members of staff have been influential in ensuring that DRR regularly appears on the agenda at senior management meetings and in raising the profile of DRR (and of climate change adaptation) in the European Parliament.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The main conclusions and the corresponding *strategic and operational* recommendations of the review are as follows:

Policy

C1 DG ECHO's current lack of a DRR policy and implementation guidance is constraining efforts to integrate the issue into humanitarian actions. Addressing DRR in a more systematic way will strengthen the coherence of DG ECHO actions with the five HFA priority areas

R1a DG ECHO should **finalise its policy on DRR** as soon as possible; this policy should be in alignment with the Hyogo Framework for Action priorities, as well as being consistent with ISDR definitions. The new policy should have high level senior management endorsement, including clarification of financial and legal implications for operational interventions. [Strategic]

R1b The DRR policy should be in **close harmony with the Communication** currently being developed by DG DEV⁶³ - the *EU Strategy for DRR in Developing Countries*; DG ECHO should maximise feedback with DG DEV during the finalisation of this Communication to ensure coherence and complementarities. [Strategic]

R1c The DRR policy should be accompanied by an **implementation strategy** developed by DG ECHO headquarters, for the dissemination of the policy, both internally and externally. This should provide for the *practical integration* of DRR with a focus on good programming and supported by clear guidelines for each major sector. Consideration should be given to the following:

- Ensure that **hazards, risks and vulnerabilities** are addressed within project planning, implementation and evaluation according to the local context.
- continuation of actions to increase preparedness and strengthen resilience of communities in disaster prone areas, the **disaster preparedness and mitigation programmes** of DIPECHO and the Horn of Africa Regional Drought Decision;
- strengthening the **inclusion of risk reduction in all disaster response and recovery Decisions** by:
 - including analysis of risk during the needs assessment;
 - consistently applying good humanitarian principles;
 - promoting the '*Do No Harm*' principle;
 - promoting Sphere standards;
 - demanding stronger beneficiary accountability, and
 - promoting good practice in humanitarian response.

This can best be represented or translated as: '*risk informed humanitarian action*'; and

- **strengthening links with development actors**, such as other EC services, EC Delegations and Member States as well as other international and regional stakeholders to ensure complementarities of policies and practice on DRR at all levels. [Strategic]

R1d DG ECHO needs **institutional clarity** in terms of the headquarters lead for DRR (by 01 or A4 respectively), as well as clarity of roles between the desks and the unit. The

Sector Support Team could play an enhanced role in the dissemination of DRR policy and training, especially for technical sectors. [Strategic]

- C2 There is confusion over DRR terminology and the concept of mainstreaming of DRR, both at DG ECHO headquarters and in field offices.**
- R2a** DG ECHO should **clarify and simplify terminology** by immediately and singularly adopting the term '*Disaster Risk Reduction*', for *all* activities under preparedness, mitigation, prevention, response and recovery. It should articulate clearly how this translates operationally. This should be aligned with the terminology to be utilised by DG DEV in their Communication on DRR (see Glossary of Terms in this report). [Strategic]
- R2b** The term 'mainstreaming' should not be used for DRR as this presents unnecessary obstacles for effective take up. The concept of *integration* could be used in its place. [Operational]
- C3 There is limited policy coherence on DRR between DG ECHO and other EC Services, which is constraining the transition of DRR across the relief to development continuum.**
- R3** Further **research and dialogue** should take place between DG Environment and DG ECHO to discuss the likely impact of *climate change* in terms of increased disaster risk and vulnerability and appropriate ways to adapt to such changes. A projection of what this may mean for all regions and countries will allow DG ECHO to adopt suitable strategies for intervention. [Operational]

Financing

- C4 Funding frameworks for preparedness interventions are clear, but financing of DRR in response activities is less straightforward and imposes constraints, although these are being overcome in some cases. There is a significant gap between DG ECHO financing and other EC Services for the transition of DRR into longer-term recovery and rehabilitation.**
- R4a** DG ECHO should explore possibilities with other EC services for **making funding instruments more cohesive** across the Commission. This may include modification of existing instruments (e.g. the Stability instrument), or possibly establishing a new funding instrument for risk reduction in order to bridge the transition of DRR along the LRRD continuum although this will need support from other EC instruments, notably DG DEV, RELEX and AIDCO. [Strategic]
- R4b** DG ECHO should consider how to use **different funding instruments** to support a common DRR strategy in each region. Country or regional 'vision' papers or strategies (for 3-5 years) could provide the opportunity to maximise the use of various funding instruments to ensure all funding is contributing to increasing resilience. [Strategic]
- R4c** DG ECHO could make use of the **thematic funding** to ensure a more consistent inclusion of DRR across for all project partners: UN agencies, the International Federation and for INGOs. The current funding for the UN Cluster System provides a

good opportunity for ensuring that DRR is included more systematically within the Cluster approach. This could include using influence through the steering committee for the upcoming evaluation to advocate for better inclusion of DRR during the development and adoption of common standards of cluster leads, and inclusion of risk analysis during joint needs assessments. [Strategic]

Staff capacity

- C5** DG ECHO field staff has a heavy administrative work-load and the integration of DRR is currently viewed as an 'additional' set of tasks. There is a perception that DG ECHO staff lack capacity or skill-sets relating to DRR, but there is willingness to learn the 'how to'. Learning is more likely to happen when the organisation makes it an objective.
- R5a** DG ECHO should develop and deliver a **DRR training package** for staff which is practical and evidence-based. The development and provision of tools and guidance could assist with this initiative. [Operational]
- R5b** DG ECHO should consider the establishment of Regional **DRR Advisor positions** (e.g. utilising Technical Advisers with DIPECHO experience) who may be required in some regions, with a phase out over time. These positions should be viewed flexibly and could include using DIPECHO Regional TAs as wider DRR advisors, leaving DIPECHO programmes to be managed by in-country TAs, which would also enhance cross-fertilisation between preparedness and response. These would act as a catalyst for the further integration of DRR into all DG ECHO Decisions, by ensuring that training is effectively undertaken, providing hands on guidance when required for Technical Advisers and also for project partners. These positions could also assist with the documentation of lesson learning and good practice and advocacy to other DRR stakeholders. In addition, more **regionally recruited Programme Assistants** should be hired in country offices to provide a greater level of support for all aspects of the technical assistance role to project partners. [Strategic]

Tools and guidance

- C6** There is limited reference to DRR in existing DG ECHO tools, with significant gaps in guidance on how to apply DRR in practice.
- R6a** DG ECHO could make **wording more explicit** in all existing documentation to ensure that DRR is appropriately considered. This should include the Single Form, and all Decision documents; criteria for review of proposals for funding could also include a sharper emphasis on risk reduction. [Operational]
- R6b** Greater understanding of impact assessment could be achieved through the use of **DRR indicators that are appropriate for humanitarian response**. Such indicators are currently being tested by a number of agencies; learning from these experiences should be applied by DG ECHO and included in **brief guidance notes with the Single Form and in the Decision guidance notes**. *NB. The inventory accompanying this report includes sample indicators for the major technical sectors; these need to*

be developed further and tested by DG ECHO during differing humanitarian action.
[Operational]

- R6c** DG ECHO should review, modify and **provide additional technical content detail** to the sector inventories contained in the accompanying document to this evaluation. These should then be disseminated widely to DG ECHO field staff; orientation and training should be provided. [Operational]
- R6d** DRR can be better integrated into **technical sectors** to reduce vulnerability. This process can be informed by tools and guidelines such as those found in the accompanying document to this evaluation report. [Operational]

Disaster risk reduction and humanitarian action

- C7** **In spite of the lack of institutionalisation of DRR within DG ECHO, there is evidence of considerable practical application in humanitarian response. However, the level to which DRR has been integrated into DG ECHO-funded humanitarian actions appears to vary considerably with type of funding decision together with attitude and familiarity with DRR concepts of both DG ECHO staff and partners being the key determinants. In addition, project partners need to be cognisant of climate change trends and predictions and ensure that their DRR action is “climate proofed”.**
- R7a** DG ECHO should continue to **promote the integration of DRR** into all humanitarian action - according to the new policy and implementation strategy; this should include lesson learning and sharing across the regions. In particular, DG ECHO should promote the **consideration of DRR in the early relief phase** where appropriate and possible (e.g. in Primary and Emergency Decisions). [Operational]
- R7b** The evaluation team recommends that DG ECHO should consider the following elements of DRR in humanitarian response, particularly in the relief phase, by:
- Incorporating risk analysis into needs assessment frameworks and implementation;
 - By making existing humanitarian sector interventions more risk-informed during planning, design and execution;
 - Promoting relevant, adequate and consistent standards for humanitarian response (Sphere and other);
 - Promoting support for livelihood recovery early on in the relief phase cycle;
 - Ensuring that any response action does not undermine local coping capacities;
 - Considering recipients of aid as active stakeholders in the process of risk reduction;
 - Supporting capacity building of local partners and local government authorities;
 - Ensuring the inclusion of risk analysis from the relief phase into the post-disaster needs assessment process (integrating DRR into LRRD).
- C8** **There is limited evidence of coordination of partners by DG ECHO around DRR in humanitarian response and lost opportunities to promote good practice and lesson learning.**
- R8** DG ECHO should ensure **better coordination of DRR action among partners** around funding Decisions. For example, pre- and post workshops for each Decision

(similar to those undertaken by DIPECHO before calls for proposals) could be used to discuss DRR opportunities. This could include discussion of applicable standards and sharing of good practice. [Operational]

- C9** **Complex emergencies driven by conflict have tended to reduce the focus on DRR.**
- R9a** DG ECHO should ensure that **Global Plans include indicators for DRR** where appropriate. Current trends towards incorporating DRR in *complex emergencies* should be continued and strengthened. [Operational]
- R9b** DG ECHO could usefully learn from the recent research being undertaken by UNDP-BCPR into the interface and dynamics between disasters and conflict. [Strategic]
- C10** **In general the DG ECHO-funded interventions for DRR in humanitarian actions are appropriate, but there is scope for improvement. Measuring the real impact and success in reducing risk is still limited.**
- R10a** Greater understanding of impact assessment could be achieved through the use of **DRR indicators that are appropriate for humanitarian response**; these need to be developed and tested by DG ECHO in its differing humanitarian action. [Operational]
- R10b** DG ECHO should support and encourage its implementing partners to incorporate more **indigenous knowledge** about risk reduction and coping strategies into the design of their programmes where appropriate and feasible. [Operational]

Partners

- C11** **There is a wide variation in capacity to address DRR in humanitarian response amongst implementing partners, which affects DG ECHO's ability to integrate DRR. DG ECHO partners tend to focus on local partners at the level of the community, local NGO and civil society groups; this may miss opportunities to build capacity at scale.**
- R11a** DG ECHO should build in criteria to the FPA stating that partners must show a demonstrated capacity for integrating DRR into their response operations. Where appropriate, DG ECHO should encourage **partners to invest their own resources** for developing a DRR policy for humanitarian actions and design appropriate training packages and roll out. [Operational]
- R11b** Where appropriate and feasible, DG ECHO should encourage partners to **strengthen capacity building of local and district level authorities** in order to ensure that local actors are better prepared and respond more effectively to small-scale, localised disasters. This will also ensure that impact is scaled-up. When working through local implementing partners, DG ECHO partners should be encouraged to provide assistance through a 'semi-operational' partnership which would allow for significant technical, logistical, and administrative support to such organisations. [Operational]
- C12** **There is a growing consensus globally among project partners that increased focus on early inclusion of livelihood support may be the most effective way of mainstreaming DRR in response.**
- R12** DG ECHO should ensure that support to a diverse range of appropriate, sustainable **livelihood options** is given greater consideration from the onset of the disaster response operations. [Operational]

Coordination

- C13** There is limited evidence of coordination of partners by DG ECHO around DRR in humanitarian response and lost opportunities to promote good practice and lesson learning. DG ECHO's UN partners and other International Organisations exhibit a mixed range of capacity to address DRR in humanitarian response, but this is an area which is receiving increasing attention and resources.
- R13a** DG ECHO should ensure better coordination of DRR action among partners around funding Decisions. For example, pre- and post workshops for each Decision (similar to those undertaken by DIPECHO before calls for proposals) could be used to discuss DRR opportunities. This could include discussion of applicable standards, lesson learning and sharing of good practice. [Operational]
- R13b** The inter-agency **DRR Working Group** at DG ECHO headquarters, should be encouraged to play a stronger role in coordination within DG ECHO in terms of DRR policy dissemination, lesson learning and sharing of good practice. This too should be mirrored at the regional and country levels. [Operational]
- C14** There is limited evidence to support the assumption that partners involved in DIPECHO programmes are better able to integrate DRR into humanitarian actions when they are also involved in response operations. There is enormous potential for scaling-up from the community level DRR projects under the DIPECHO programme, which should be further explored by DG ECHO (and other funding instruments).
- R14** DG ECHO should work to break down the 'institutional barriers' around DIPECHO to ensure better learning and linkages between disaster preparedness and mitigation action (under DIPECHO) and humanitarian response; DG ECHO should consider whether country Technical Advisers could include DIPECHO within their responsibility with support from regional experts. Issues of workloads and priorities would need to be carefully considered. All DG ECHO Technical Advisers should encourage project partners to ensure that DRR is included on the agenda of meetings, coordination sessions and workshops and that DIPECHO and DG ECHO partners participate. Where feasible a small budget should be included for such activities in project partner's proposals. [Operational]

Knowledge management

- C15** There is limited evidence of institutionalised lesson learning and dissemination on good practice about DRR within DG ECHO.
- R15** DG ECHO should improve documentation and dissemination of DRR action and of good practice. **Decision outcome reports** could provide the global mechanism for this (following the 2002 guidelines); conclusions and lessons learnt in terms of successes in DRR for each Decision could be discussed by partners and recorded in the reports. These reports would then start to build both evidence and experience of good practice in DRR (by hazard type). [Operational]

- C16** The cost-effectiveness and efficiency of integrating DRR into DG ECHO-funded humanitarian actions is not well understood internally. More evidence would help DG ECHO in advocating with other humanitarian donors, as well as with broader EC Services. To date the evidence for the cost-benefit of DRR investments in humanitarian response is limited, but the inclusion of DRR elements as recommended above do not imply heavy additional costs
- R16a** DG ECHO should consider allocating funds to partners to conduct focused research studies linked to the action that is undertaken on the impact of DRR interventions, as well as the additional costs (and cost savings), i.e. **cost : benefit analysis**. These studies should attempt to measure both immediate short-term risk reduction (within the cycle of a response) and the impact of risk reduction in future events (through longitudinal case studies). [Operational]
- R16b** DG ECHO should also **investigate similar research** currently underway or planned, by Member State donor agencies to benefit from existing knowledge and to avoid duplication of funding. [Operational]
- C17** DG ECHO partners, have to differing degrees, applied knowledge gained from indigenous practices and coping strategies on DRR, although these have been overlooked and undervalued by some organisations.
- R17** Research should be undertaken to ascertain and apply lessons gained from **indigenous DRR knowledge and practice** through greater engagement with communities in disaster prone areas. It is important that DG ECHO encourages partners to examine objectively different forms of knowledge (indigenous and other) and try to identify the most suitable DRR action for each situation. [Operational]

Advocacy

- C18** Advocacy requires both good analysis - knowing who to lobby, and what for - and a coordinated strategy involving different stakeholders. There has been some progress in advocacy for DRR by DG ECHO and its partners, but it has not been carried out systematically.
- R18a** Once developed, DG ECHO should use its new DRR policy and the DRR Communication from DG Dev to develop **advocacy messages** promoting the effective integration of DRR into all programmes. These could be global, regional and country specific and could target a range of audiences, from partners, to national and local government authorities and civil society. [Operational]
- R18b** DG ECHO should play a more formal role in **advocacy towards the rest of the EC**. This could include bolstering the work of the inter-service working group on DRR at Brussels level, and encouraging workshops and meetings at country level to include the review of DRR-related issues for: **Country Strategy Paper** development, joint advocacy to Government, and influencing regional bodies, e.g. in South Asia (SAARC) and in Southeast Asia (ASEAN). [Strategic]
- R18c** Given the scale of humanitarian funding, there is a strong role for DG ECHO in **championing DRR** amongst other donors, especially Member States, and selectively with national governments. This role could become more robust with a body of empirical evidence based on humanitarian practice and field research. [Operational]

Glossary of terms

According to the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), which is the key coordinator for the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action the following definitions should be utilised by DG ECHO throughout (i.e. in all Decisions documentation, etc.):

Disaster risk reduction: the conceptual framework of elements considered with the possibilities to minimise vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society, to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development⁶⁴.

DRR could be said to comprise of **preparedness, mitigation and prevention**, keeping in mind that in reality many actions include a mix of both mitigation and prevention:

Preparedness: Organisational activities which ensure that the systems, procedures and resources required to confront a natural disaster are available in order to provide timely assistance to those affected, using existing mechanisms wherever possible. (E.g. training, awareness raising, establishment of disaster plans, evacuation plans, pre-positioning of stocks, early warning mechanisms, strengthening indigenous knowledge).

Mitigation: Measures taken before disasters which intend to reduce or eliminate their impact on society and environment. These measures reduce the physical vulnerability of existing infrastructures or of vulnerable sites which endanger directly the populations (e.g. retrofitting of buildings, reinforce "lifeline" infrastructure).

Prevention: Activities conceived to ensure a permanent protection against a disaster. These include engineering, physical protection measures, legislative measures for the control of land use and codes of construction. These activities reduce the physical vulnerability and/or exposure to risks through infrastructures (e.g. dams, flood barriers, building of refuges) and sustainable development practices (e.g. no deforestation in upstream areas).

Another concept that is central to DRR is the concept of **resilience**. DRR is about enhancing the levels of resilience of disaster prone countries and societies with a focus on a long-term vision of building capacity and strengthening people and societies rather than crisis management.

Resilience: The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organising itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures.

Whilst the use of the word 'mainstreaming' is not encouraged (to be replaced by integration wherever possible) for the purposes of this evaluation the following definition⁶⁵ has been adopted:

Mainstreaming means expanding and enhancing DRR so that it becomes normal practice, fully institutionalised within an agency's relief and development agenda. It has three purposes:

- To make certain that the development programmes and projects that originate from or are funded by an agency are designed with evident consideration for potential disaster risks and to resist hazard impact;
- To make certain that all the development programmes and projects that originate from or are funded by an agency do not inadvertently increase vulnerability to disaster in all sectors: social, physical, economic and environmental;
- To make certain that all the disaster relief and rehabilitation programmes and projects that originate from or are funded by an agency are designed to contribute to developmental aims and reduce future disaster risk.

List of abbreviations and acronyms

ACF	<i>Action Contre la Faim</i>
ACP	Africa Caribbean Pacific
AIDCO	European Commission EuropeAid Co-operation Office
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CBO	community based organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DFID	Department for International Development, UK government
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DIPECHO	disaster preparedness programme of the European Commission Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid
DRR	disaster risk reduction
DG DEV	Directorate General for Development
DG ECHO	Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid
DG RELEX	Directorate General for External Relations
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EuropeAid	European Commission Co-operation Office (also known as AIDCO)
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
GTZ	<i>Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</i>
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
HQ	Headquarters
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INGO	international non governmental organisation
LRRD	link between relief, rehabilitation and development
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MoH	Ministry of Health
NGO	non governmental organisation
OPS/PED	<i>El apoyo y coordinación del Programa de Preparativos para Situaciones de Emergencia y Socorro en casos de Desastres</i>
PAHO	Pan American Health Organisation
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RSO	Regional Support Office
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SC-UK	Save the Children UK
Sphere	Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response Project
SST	Sector Support Team (DG ECHO Unit 01 support team in Nairobi)
TA	Technical Adviser
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	water, sanitation and hygiene for all
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

¹ See Glossary of Terms at the end of this report for the definitions utilised during this evaluation and proposed for adoption by DG ECHO and other Commission services

² See: www.unisdr.org/wcdr/intergover/official-doc/L-docs/Hyogo-framework-for-action-english.pdf

³ *'Towards a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid'*, European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM (2007) 317, June 2007, page 9

⁴ *'EU Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction in Developing Countries'*, Directorate-General Development and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States, April 2008 (currently circulating as an Issues Paper)

⁵ Aguaconsult Ltd. specialises in the provision of consulting and advisory services in the fields of disaster risk reduction and water supply, sanitation and environmental health; for further details see: www.aguaconsult.co.uk

⁶ See Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of Disaster Risk Reduction Mainstreaming in DG ECHO's Humanitarian Actions, October 2007

⁷ The Aguaconsult team comprised of two principal evaluators, Dr. Ian Wilderspin (team leader and DRR expert) and Jane Barham (humanitarian expert) who visited all field countries, and three sector specialists each of whom was involved in one regional visit, Dr. Khondkar Iftekhar Ahmed (Shelter expert; Asia mission), Dr. Gerry Gill (food security and livelihoods expert; Africa mission) and Harold Lockwood (water and sanitation expert; Latin America and Caribbean mission)

⁸ The team was unable to meet the TA in Bangladesh, which resulted in a less comprehensive picture being established than in any other countries visited

⁹ The five HFA priority areas include: 1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation; 2. Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning; 3. Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels; 4. Reduce underlying risk factors; and 5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels

¹⁰ For example, there have been 14 consecutive Global Plans in Burundi, spanning a period of 15 years or more.

¹¹ *'Disaster Preparedness and Prevention (DPP): State of Play and strategic orientations for EC Policy'* Commission Staff Working Paper, DG ECHO, 2003

¹² Ibid, European Commission, 2007

¹³ Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, endorsed in Stockholm, June 2003 by Germany, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the European Commission, Denmark, the United States, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, Luxemburg, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland, see: <http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org/>

¹⁴ See *'An Evaluation of DG ECHO Financed Activities in the Health Sector'*, ETC, August 2007, para 10, page v

¹⁵ See Glossary of Terms at the end of this report

¹⁶ For example, ACP countries receive some funding as a share of EDF Envelope B disbursements; this amounted to just over €28 million under the 9th plan (2003 to 2006).

¹⁷ All financial figures quoted are from DG ECHO Financial Report, 2006.

¹⁸ Most partners appeared unclear as to how DRR can be addressed in Primary Emergency response contexts, with few exceptions (e.g. Intermón Oxfam who expressed the need to think about rehabilitation and risk reduction from the outset, even if the actual response does not include direct DRR components)

¹⁹ In Bangladesh, for the Sidr response operation in 2007, several DG ECHO partners expressed doubts as to the appropriateness of DRR. On the basis of interviews with implementing partners, the evaluation team is of the opinion that this situation may have been influenced to some extent by the wording in the Primary Decision: *'purely aimed at immediate relief'*

²⁰ The survey was carried out in September 2007 and received responses from 39 out of 50 desk staff and 55 out of 97 Technical Assistants questioned.

²¹ The new Single Form is considered to be better by some DG ECHO staff – it is essentially the same as the early version but reduced in size and avoiding the duplications. The bad thing, which operational units have expressed concern about is the absence of a budget as such, which will not aid monitoring and evaluation. Because of this, a lot of information on costs has been added in the Single Form itself, which might become cumbersome.

²² The new Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) is very much *"finance-control"* oriented, at least in its terminology, however, the objectives and principals remain pretty much the same and there are no drastic

changes between the 2003 and 2008 FPA, more or less more simplifications and flexibility on a few things, in particular procurement and equipment, etc.

²³ Both of these draft documents were developed by the DG ECHO sub-regional office in Quito

²⁴ See: *ECHO's Response to Small-Scale Disasters*, ECHO/A/3 Retreat, 7-9 October 2007, European Commission, Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid – ECHO, Directorate A Operations, Unit A/3 Asia and Latin America

²⁵ The interface and dynamics between conflict and disaster risk is still relatively unknown, although the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery of UNDP is currently undertaking a global research study into this area; the final outputs of the study should be available in late 2008.

²⁶ E.g. in El Salvador there was a strong understanding of DRR in response and rehabilitation phases, with several NGOs having developed strategies and institutional strengthening of their own organisations and partners: ActionAid, Oxfam GB and CARE who have global DRR advisors

²⁷ Under an *Ad hoc* decision in Guyana an innovative approach was taken to integrate ways of working on DRR in response and cost-saving/reduction of transaction costs, by combining all elements of a DIPECHO proposal (Oxfam GB)

²⁸ Unfortunately the team was not able to meet with the TA in Bangladesh at the time of the field work due to ill health, therefore the findings are based on discussions with a range of partners and direct observation. Although many are DIPECHO partners with a greater conceptual clarity of DRR, it seemed more challenging for some to ensure that risk reduction activities were incorporated into their rapid disaster response operations. Subsequent clarifications by the DG ECHO Desk Officer for Bangladesh confirm that the incorporation of DRR into Primary Emergency responses is very challenging. But despite this, the Desk did provide further evidence of integration of DRR into the Emergency Decisions for Cyclone Sidr.

²⁹ E.g. in Bolivia, the better articulated DRR components in emergency response projects are from NGOs that have strong experience and institutional capacity in this area; these organisations have existing programmes in the country and some are DIPECHO partners (e.g. COOPI, PAHO, Oxfam GB) although many still treated DRR as a separate component in humanitarian response and focused very much on disaster preparedness - specifically upon capacity building of communities and local organisations

³⁰ For example, findings from the evaluation of DIPECHO Actions Plans for South East Asia, Aquaconsult Ltd. – Transtec 2006 and the Ex-ante Evaluation of Potential DIPECHO Interventions in South East Africa and South West Indian Ocean, Sher – Transtec, 2007

³¹ ECHO mission reports, e.g. WFP, Sudan

³² E.g. after the 2005 Mozambique floods, World Bank studies concluded that a '*lack of community participation and inappropriate designs were identified as major weaknesses in the shelter/housing response to the 1998 floods*'. See ALNAP-ProVention: www.odl.org.uk/alnap/publications/pdfs/ALNAP-ProVention_flood_lessons.pdf

³³ an exception being Islamic Relief, who chose to work through the local government "Relief and Rehabilitation Committees" to help to build local government capacities

³⁴ The Sphere Minimum Standards for Disaster Response are internationally agreed guidelines that delineate good practice and minimum standards in relief activities: www.sphereproject.org; this evaluations found that DG ECHO generally encourages partners in the use of Sphere standards in their response

³⁵ See: *After the cyclone: lessons from a disaster*, Oxfam Briefing Note, February 2008

³⁶ Some local NGOs appeared to have limited knowledge of Sphere standards, or mentioned that these standards were too comprehensive for the local context needed to be adapted and contextualised; others were unclear about the application of DRR in response operations; this might be due to their prolonged experience of approaching response operations primarily as relief distributions (i.e. not able to "think outside the box") or because the vast majority were development organisations.

³⁷ E.g. in Uganda, the DG ECHO Technical Adviser has seen many VIP latrines that do not function as they should

³⁸ See: "*Sustainable Relief and Reconstruction in Post-Crisis Situations*", Theme Paper, UN Habitat, 2005

³⁹ *Reducing the Risk of Disasters – Helping to Achieve Sustainable Poverty Reduction in a Vulnerable World: A Policy Paper*, DFID, March 2006

⁴⁰ E.g. in Indonesia following the Jogjakarta earthquake, DG ECHO commented (in internal documentation) upon the use of Sphere standards by project partners as a monitoring tool

⁴¹ E.g. in Bangladesh and in Bolivia (Santa Cruz) many DIEPCHO partners also responded to emergency relief actions under 'regular' DG ECHO programming

⁴² See: www.icva.ch/doc00001572.html

⁴³ See: 'Towards the Development of a Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy for UNICEF', UNICEF Education and Disaster Preparedness Sections, Draft report, May 2007

⁴⁴ The cluster approach is a renewed effort on the part of the UN system to fill identified gaps in humanitarian response, to ensure accountability with strengthened leadership and clearly defined roles and responsibilities, and to bolster co-ordination and synergy of efforts.

⁴⁵ See: 'Cluster Approach Evaluation Report' commissioned by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), November 2007, www.odi.org.uk/hpg

⁴⁶ E.g. in the Dominican Republic, coordination of DG ECHO partners around hygiene promotion messages and materials to ensure consistent messages to the community and inclusion of hygiene promotion in water related activities

⁴⁷ Providing an overview of measures taken to reduce risk and describing the various technical innovations undertaken in the reconstruction effort, including seismic and wind resistant designs, terracing of slopes, risk studies and mapping and the construction of flood mitigation structures (cleaning and rehabilitation of drainage channels)

⁴⁸ In 2007/08, in Northern Kenya, linkages were made with six DG ECHO project partners and the EC delegation to secure funding for €2m for a 36month period for animal health and WatSan programmes following a series of DG ECHO emergency interventions

⁴⁹ E.g. seismic housing reconstruction in Peru and animal health and water and sanitation in Kenya

⁵⁰ *Institutional donor progress with mainstreaming disaster risk reduction*, Paul Venton and Sarah La Trobe, A Tearfund research project in collaboration with UN/ISDR, 2007, see: <http://www.tearfund.org/webdocs/website/Campaigning/Policy%20and%20research/DRR%20donor%20progress%202007.pdf>

⁵¹ Issues Paper: *EU Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction in Developing Countries*, April 2008

⁵² For DG ECHO partners there are limited options to follow-through with DRR in long-term development funding frameworks; one possible mechanism is through the Non-state actor budget line of the EC Delegation – open to any international or local NGO, but viewed as limited in scale and therefore not hopeful in terms of application and significant scaling up

⁵³ In the Caribbean the EC is funding several significant programmes relating to DRR, including, in the Dominican Republic, a three-year, €6m UNDP-managed preparedness programme (developed from the basis of a DIPECHO project); funding for these programmes comes from the 'B' Envelope of EDF (although this is dependent on emergencies and therefore not seen as effective for long-term mainstreaming as regular development funding – the 'A' envelope)

⁵⁴ DG ECHO and emergency response under the 'B' envelope of EDF should generate scope for synergy, but in fact 'B' envelope procedures are not attuned to emergency response. The biggest hope for overcoming this is that the EC intends to adopt the "Fragile States" approach, using the OECD procedures. If this happens the 'B' envelope procedures may become more flexible. It remains to be seen whether this will in turn create a more interactive relationship between ECHO and EDF 'B' envelope initiatives, and therefore greater scope for LRRD

⁵⁵ The Instrument for Stability came into being in November 2006 (European Parliament and European Council, "Regulation Establishing an Instrument for Stability", EC Regulation No 1717/2006, November 15 2006) and replaced the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, (which was considered cumbersome as it could only finance projects of up to six months) - DG RELEX "Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)", December 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/rrm/index.htm; the Instrument supports action that aims at: *getting the public administration working; supporting the preparation of a national budget in order to mobilise donor/multilateral funds for reconstruction; getting children back to school; re-opening health and local public services; generating employment*

⁵⁶ For example the recent Stability Instrument decision in Bangladesh states: "The IfS programme is complementary with the ongoing EC-funded food security and disaster management interventions in Bangladesh and bridges the gap between the emergency phase and longer term recovery and development, for which the EC Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2007-2010 will commit resources for longer term disaster risk reduction and food security (€ 20 million for Disaster Risk Reduction and € 20 million for Food Security)." This is a good example of a transition mechanism for DRR to a development context.

⁵⁷ In all countries there are good examples of linkages between DG ECHO and other EC instruments. Where DIPECHO operates, the EC delegations are invited (along with other major donors, all DIPECHO project partners, relevant government disaster management authorities, etc.) prior to the call for proposals. In Bangladesh, for example the EC Delegation was invited to the DIPECHO partners meeting, in which partners

were encouraged to consider submitting proposals to the EC for the €35 million 2007 livelihoods fund, which specifically mentions the inclusion of DRR. Many DG ECHO partners already have funding from other EC instruments for their development programmes. Disaster response operations always necessarily increase communication between DG ECHO and other EC funding instruments (although there is limited evidence of DG ECHO's role in influencing these on DRR). In some cases the EC delegations themselves appear active in the area, e.g. in Bangladesh recently supporting the publication of a comprehensive: "*Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment for Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction*" document, which makes numerous references to DRR. Also in Bangladesh, the EC is also one of the major contributors to the Comprehensive DM Programme (managed by UNDP and also funded by DFID) which provides the overall framework for DRR in the country; project partners are common to DG ECHO. In Bolivia, the EC delegation has a thematic funding stream for community-based integrated development, which could easily be adapted to include DRR and build on the basis of DIPECHO and DG ECHO funding decisions

⁵⁸ See: Issues Paper, April 2008

⁵⁹ One positive example is the Austrian Red Cross Society in Timor-Leste, 2008

⁶⁰ The World Bank established the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) in support of implementation of the HFA in low and middle-income countries at high disaster risk. The GFDRR has three funding tracks: Track 1 provides global and regional support to the UN ISDR system, Track 2 provides support to countries for developing investment frameworks for disaster risk prevention and mitigation, and Track 3 is a Standby Recovery Financing Facility (in pipeline)

⁶¹ Spearheaded by ProVention Consortium and UNDP, the main objective of GRIP is "*an improved evidence base for disaster risk management to enable the application and prioritisation of effective disaster risk reduction strategies at the national, regional and global scales*", see:

<http://www.proventionconsortium.org/?pageid=32&projectid=3>

⁶² *Transforming the commitment into action: EU progress with mainstreaming disaster risk reduction*, Tearfund Disaster Risk Reduction Briefing Paper 1, Tearfund, 2006

⁶³ at the time of drafting this report this was circulating as an Issues Paper

⁶⁴ There are other definitions of DRR but there is increasing convergence towards the ISDR definition. therein addition, there are differing views on how best to break down this definition into more operational concepts, the division into preparedness, mitigation and prevention is thought to provide the most pragmatic approach for DRR practitioners involved with DG ECHO projects

⁶⁵ See EU: *Progress with Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction*, Tearfund, 2006.